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T HIS COMMENT discusses products liability with respect to
electronic parts incorporated into assembled products and
in particular to parts that are operated at temperatures beyond
those recommended by their manufacturers. The treatment
here applies to operation of the devices at temperatures higher
than the maximum and lower than the minimum recom-
mended by the manufacturer. Is the parts manufacturer liable
when parts fail under these conditions? Analogous situations
would be the use of mechanical parts beyond their margin of
safety, where liability may turn on whether the defect, or the
misuse, caused any resulting injury.' Such situations might in-
clude farm equipment running faster than recommended
whose pulleys explode and cause injury,2 automobiles that crash
* The author wishes to express his gratitude to Professors Alberto Bernabe
and Craig Peterson of The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, IL, for their help
and encouragement in the preparation of this comment.
** Dave Okey is a candidate for the J.D. degree in Jan. 2000 from the John
Marshall Law School. He has accepted a position with the intellectual property
law firm of Brinks Hofer Gilson & Lione, Chicago, IL.
I See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5 cmt. b (1998)
(stating that if aluminum used to manufacture aircraft engines departs from the
aluminum manufacturer's specifications due to the presence of foreign particles,
the seller of the defective aluminum is subject to liability for harm to persons or
property caused by the defects in the aluminum). Comment a states, however,
that as a general rule, component sellers should not be liable when the compo-
nent itself is not defective. Id. at cmt. a. Thus, a seller of aluminum without
defect would not be liable if the purchaser uses the aluminum in a way that
causes harm.
2 See Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co., 79 N.W.2d 688
(Minn. 1956). In Lovejoy, the Minnesota Supreme Court overturned a lower
court's directed verdict for the defendant manufacturer and ordered a new trial.
Id. at 697. The court noted that it was the law in Minnesota that there was no
negligence if risk could not reasonably be anticipated, but that it was a question
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when driven at excessive speeds and harm others, I and aircraft
that break up when carrying loads in excess of their design
limit.4
This comment first examines electronics by discussing briefly
the differences between older vacuum-tube technology and the
present state of the art in solid-state electronics. Just as vacuum
tube applications changed to solid-state devices, another change
is now sweeping over electronics as plastic-encapsulated
microcircuits replace older, hermetic technologies.5
for the jury whether the manufacturer should have anticipated that the engine of
the farm tractor would be driven on a down-hill road, at a speed that would rotate
the pulley faster than the material and the design used for its manufacture. See
id. at 693. It was undisputed that the manufacturer had given instructions con-
cerning the recommended maximum speed of the machine and the pulley. See
id. at 691.
3 See Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967). Schemel
was riding in a car struck in the rear by the driver of a GM-manufactured car. See
id. at 803. Schemel claimed that GM should have foreseen that someone would
drive cars capable of 115 miles per hour at excessive and unlawful speeds, creat-
ing a risk to the public in general and, in particular, to bystanders such as him.
See id. at 804. The Seventh Circuit affirmed GM's motion to dismiss, and noted
that the manufacturer is not an insurer of its products; therefore, it is under no
duty to anticipate and guard against grossly careless misuse of its product by reck-
less drivers. See id. at 805. Schemel argued that any automobile that can be
driven at speeds of 110-115 miles per hour on roads not designed for such speeds
is dangerous for the uses for which it was manufactured. See id. at 804. The court
agreed with GM, however, ruling that GM was under no duty to conceal in its
advertising the "reserve power" built into the car in order to avoid possible mis-
use of that power by a wantonly negligent driver. See id. at 805.
4 See British Airways Bd. v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1978). A Boeing
707 jet aircraft crashed near Mt. Fuji, Japan, and British Airways, the operator,
sued Boeing Co., the manufacturer, under several theories, including products
liability. See id. at 949. Boeing argued that the accident was not due to manufac-
turing or design defects, but to severe air turbulence encountered when the pilot
flew too close to Mt. Fuji at too low an altitude. See id. at 950. Boeing claimed
that the turbulence was so severe that the aircraft exceeded its design strength,
causing the aircraft to disintegrate. See id. at 952. The Japan Civil Aeronautics
Board's report stated that the probable cause of the accident was that the aircraft
suddenly encountered abnormally severe turbulence which imposed a "gust
load" considerably in excess of the aircraft's design limit. See id. at 952 & n.10.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Boeing in spite of undis-
puted evidence of some fatigue failure in important components, ruling that
these failures were not a contributing cause of the accident. See British Airways
Bd., 585 F.2d at 949-50. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, noting that British Airways
had never gone beyond allegations of causation. See id. at 954-55.
5 See MICHAEL G. PECHT, ET AL., PLASTIC-ENCAPSULATED MICROELECTRONICS:
MATERIALS, PROCESSES, QuALiry, RELIABILITY, AND APPLICATIONS 1 (1995) [herein-
after PECHT] (stating that over 97% of the world's microcircuits use plastic pack-
ages). Pecht states that the "package" is that part of the device that contains an
integrated microcircuit "chip," the leadframe, which is electrically intercon-
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In the background, I look closely at a case in which the failure
of electronic parts may have contributed to a tragic loss of life.6
In the discussion, I examine lawsuits concerning components in
light of the several theories of products liability. I then gather
defenses to products liability causes of action, and see how the
theories of liability interact with the defenses. I have concluded
that the use of a part outside its recommended operating envel-
ope acts to interpose a number of defenses between the manu-
facturer and liability for the product.7 While there may still be
liability under some circumstances, the conduct of the user and
the reasonableness of his actions, or the lack thereof, may be the
principal determinant of liability. Specific coverage may be
found elsewhere for cases involving personal injury or death
caused by product misuse generally,8 by contributory negligence
or assumption of the risk in use of products, 9 by misuse of elec-
trical equipment specifically, 10 and by defects in aircraft parts or
equipment.11
Modern aircraft and other equipment with a high need for
reliability depend on solid-state electronics to a great degree.12
nected to input-output leads, and the interconnects themselves. See id. at 1. Her-
metic devices use metal or ceramic packages, but less-expensive plastic packages
now account for 97% of worldwide microcircuit sales, because of their advantages
in cost, size, weight, performance and availability. See id. at 1.
6 See Woodling v. Garrett Corp., 813 F.2d 543, 554 (2d Cir. 1987).
7 See generally Linda A. Banks, Legal Implications of Using Parts Outside of the
Manufacturer's Specifications, CALCE Electronic Products and Systems Consor-
tium, University of Maryland, June 17, 1998. CALCE stands for the University of
Maryland's Computer-Aided Life Cycle Engineering Center, an institution which
has focused in recent years on the durability and economics of microelectronics.
CALCE is now a leading center of research into the reasons for failure and mech-
anisms of failure of electronic parts, and an advocate for failure reporting and
corrective action systems for failed electronic parts. See generally PECHT, supra
note 5. Banks explores the topic of products liability for components manufac-
turers. See APEM Course, infra note 25.
8 See Randy R. Koenders, Annotation, Products Liability: Product Misuse Defense,
65 A.L.R.4TH 263 (1989).
9 See Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Products Liability: Contributory Negligence or As-
sumption of Risk as Defense Under Doctrine of Strict Liability in Tort, 46 A.L.R.3D 240
(1972).
10 See Randy R. Koenders, Annotation, Products Liability: Sufficiency of Evidence to
Support Product Misuse Defense in Actions Concerning Electrical Generation and Trans-
mission Equipment, 55 A.L.R.4TH 1010 (1987).
11 See Sonja A. Soehnel, Annotation, Products Liability: Personal Injury or Death
Allegedly Caused by Defect in Aircraft or Its Parts, Supplies, or Equipment, 97 A.L.R.3D
627 (1980).
12 See Michael G. Pecht, Open Forum Editorial, 20 I.E.E.E. TRANSACTIONS ON
COMPONENTS, PACKAGING, AND MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY- PART A 251 (1997)
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All parties concerned with the manufacture, distribution, assem-
bly and sale of these products may face liability for every compo-
nent in the end item. 13 A harmed person need not have privity
of contract with anyone in the chain of distribution in order to
bring a lawsuit.14
The state of the art in electronics has evolved steadily since
the invention of the transistor in 1948.15 Modern electronics are
almost entirely "solid state," with notable exceptions, such as
high power electronics. 16 All types of modern circuitry are now
manufactured as solid-state devices, from simple diodes to very
complicated integrated circuits and microprocessors.17 The dis-
tinguishing characteristic of solid state devices is the "pn" junc-
tion, which replaces the gap between the anode and the cathode
[hereinafter Pecht, Editorial] (stating that avionics systems, as well as automotive
systems, use semiconductor devices suitable for various temperature ranges, in-
cluding commercial parts (0-70'C), industrial (-40 to +850C), automotive (-40 to
+125°C), and military (-55 to +125 0C). The Fahrenheit temperature ranges corre-
sponding to these are 32-158*F for commercial, -40 to +185°F for industrial, -40 to
+2570F for automotive, and -67 to +257°F for military).
13 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. b, illus. 1 (1965) [herein-
after § 402A], (stating that retailers are responsible for a duty of care arising from
an undetectable defect in a hypothetical "can of beans" that passes through their
hands). The rule applies although the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product. See id. at § 402A, cmt. a.
14 See id. at cmt. 1. (stating that the rule applies although the user or seller has
not brought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller).
15 See GEORGE GILDER, MICROCOSM: THE QUANTUM REVOLUTION IN ECONOMICS
AND TECHNOLOGY 49 (First Touchstone ed. 1990) (stating that the transistor was
invented in 1948 and noting that the transistor is primarily a switch). Gilder's
book is an excellent history of the evolution of electronics technology from the
theories of matter of Bohr and Einstein to microcomputers.
16 See Robert S. Symons, Tubes: Still Vital After All These Years, 35 I.E.E.E. SPEC-
TRUM 52, 53 (Apr. 1998) (stating that people are beginning to realize most elec-
tron tubes have been eliminated, and opining that those who make a living
selling new equipment to the government think they can make their job a little
easier if they conjure up a national memory of putting all the tubes from a TV
into a little brown bag and taking them to the tube-testing machine at the local
drug store).
17 See GILDER, supra note 15, at 68 (noting that transistors, based on silicon, are
the basis for large-scale integrated circuits and microprocessors, and are used to
shape the information age and run personal computers). A good treatment of
small-power and control circuits can be found in THEODORE F. BOGART,JR., ELEC-
TRONIC DEVICES AND CIRCUITS (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter BOGART], while power
electronics circuits are well-covered in NED MOHAN ET. AL., POWER ELECTRONICS:
CONVERTERS, APPLICATIONS, AND DESIGN (1989) [hereinafter MOHAN].
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in vacuum tubes. 18 The pn junction acts as a switch and forms
the basis for many other solid-state devices. 9 These devices are
used in many kinds of circuits and end-items, including com-
puters, automobiles, aircraft, and military and space vehicles.2 °
After manufacture of the devices themselves, the circuits are
tested, separated from one another and mounted in packages.21
Hermetic packaging, once the dominant choice in the indus-
try, now consumes less than three percent of the integrated cir-
cuit market.2 2 Despite the low production volumes for hermetic
1s See ADEL S. SEDRA & KENNETH C. SMITH, MICROELECTRONIC CIRCUITS 118 (3d
ed. 1991) [hereinafter SEDRA] (stating that even the terminology of the two ends
of a diode, the anode and the cathode, are a carryover from the days of vacuum-
tube diodes). The pnjunction is formed when p-type semiconductor material is
brought into close contact with n-type material. See id. at 169. N-type semicon-
ductor material is formed when silicon is doped with a small amount of an elec-
tron-donating impurity such as phosphorus, while p-type material is formed when
the silicon is doped with a small amount of electron-accepting impurity such as
boron. See id. at 171-72.
19 See id. at 117; BOGART and MOHAN, supra note 17, for examples. The familiar
transistor is the first step up from a diode. A bipolar junction transistor consists
of two pn junctions, in the form of n-p-n or p-n-p junctions. See BOGART, supra
note 17, at 88.
20 See GILDER, supra note 15, at 80 (noting that the motivation for use in mis-
siles and space vehicles was the concept of miniaturization, and that it was
achieved through new semiconductor companies).
21 See SEDRA, supra note 18, at A-3 to A-4 (stating that a finished silicon wafer
may contain 100 to 1000 finished circuits or chips, each containing from 10 to 10
million transistors). The circuits are first tested electrically with automatic prob-
ing equipment, and they are then separated and mounted in packages, which are
sealed under vacuum or in an inert atmosphere. See id.
22 See PECHT, supra note 5, at 1 (stating that 97% of the world's microcircuits
use plastic packages). Hermetics include metal, glass and ceramic packages, im-
pervious to water vapor or other intrusions. Plastics typically use an epoxy resin
to protect the semiconductor die from the outside environment. Pecht makes
the point in a later article that the applications which drive the semiconductor
industry, and hence the technology, are the computer, consumer, and telecom-
munications industries. See Pecht, Editorial supra note 12, at 251. In this 1997
publication, he estimates that these three industries will have a combined market
share of 93% by the year 2000. See id.
Here, the concern is primarily with what are called "plastic encapsulated
microcircuits." A plastic encapsulated microcircuit (PEM), often called a plastic
package, consists of an integrated circuit chip physically attached to a leadframe,
electrically interconnected to input-output leads, and molded in a plastic that is
in direct contact with the chip, the leadframe and the interconnecting parts of
the circuit. See PECHT, supra note 5, at 1. In comparison, a hermetically sealed
microcircuit (generally called a hermetic package) consists of an integrated cir-
cuit chip mounted in a metal or ceramic cavity, interconnected to the leads, and
hermetically sealed to maintain a contact environment within the package. See id.
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parts, the industry has only recently dispelled the notion that
hermetic packaging is superior to plastic packaging. 2
The military market in particular is characterized by the need
for highly reliable circuits, their use guarded by defense depart-
ment standards and handbooks.24 Despite this high demand,
fewer and fewer parts are now available in "mil spec" ratings be-
tween minus sixty-five Celsius and positive one hundred twenty-
five Celsius (-650C to +125°C).25 As a result, a user of such parts
must rely more and more on non-hermetic parts.26 Such parts
may or may not be available in specifications guaranteed by the
manufacturer for ranges outside those considered standard, the
"commercial" grade at 0-700C, or "industrial" at -40 to +850C. 2 7
If a particular part is available in a range outside of these two
grades, it will likely be hermetically packaged and graded as
"military," and will typically be suitable for temperatures ranging
from -55C to +125°C. 2s The more economical plastic encapsu-
lated parts are generally not offered in temperature ranges
above "industrial."29
The need for higher temperature capabilities, and the paucity
of parts offerings in this range, has led to the practice of "uprat-
ing. "30 Uprating is defined as the practice of using commercial
23 See id. at 2.
24 See id.
25 See Advanced Plastic Encapsulated Microelectronics Course, University of
Maryland, CALCE Electronic Packaging Research Center, Aug. 20, 1996, at § 2.1
[hereinafter APEM course] (naming ten companies that have exited the market-
place for various military applications between 1992 and 1995, including Motor-
ola and Advanced Micro Devices).
The list of companies is updated in Pecht's 1997 article and includes compa-
nies leaving the military market in 1992 (Micron Technologies and Elantec),
1993 (Texas Instruments), 1994 (Seeq, Advanced Micro Devices (AMD), XICOR
and Motorola), 1995 (Altera and Zilog), as well as two large producers leaving in
1997 (Phillips and Intel). See PECHT, Editorial, supra note 12, at 252.
26 See APEM course, supra note 25, at § 7 (stating that avionics for air transport
aircraft is essentially a plastics-dominated business).
27 See, e.g., ILC Data Device Corp., RDC-19220 Series 16-BIT Monolithic Track-
ing Resolver (/LVDT)-to-Digital Converters at 20 (1990) (data sheet in 1998 re-
printed catalogue) (listing plastic parts for 0-70'C and -40 to +85°C temperature
use ranges).
28 Id. (listing the same parts in a ceramic package for -55 to +125'C tempera-
ture range).
29 APEM Course, supra note 25, at § 2.1 (stating that there are only four ven-
dors approved to supply such plastic surface-mount parts).
30 See generally Patrick McCluskey, Uprating of Parts for Use in Harsh Environments,
(last updated 3/18/97) <http://www.CALCE.UMD.edu/general/projects/sum-
mary/1997/C97-05.htm> [hereinafter McCluskey]; Pecht Editorial, supra note 12,
at 251 (stating that, for example, many military systems such as the new
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or industrial parts in environments where conditions are beyond
the manufacturer's ratings.3 1 Uses contemplated specifically in-
clude such harsh environments as avionics and automotive un-
derhood uses. 2 Progress has been good, and recent studies
find little evidence of failures of the devices, such as delamina-
tion and cracking, at temperatures as low as -65°C (-85°F), at the
fastest ramping rates, and even with moisture saturated de-
vices. 3 Research continues and the practice has found accept-
ance with the manufacturers of most of the world's transport
aircraft.34 In the next section of this comment, I will illustrate
Camanche helicopter use commercial devices, and automotive systems and avion-
ics systems, such as those used on the Boeing 777, use devices from all tempera-
ture categories of semiconductor devices: commercial, industrial, automotive and
military).
s1 See McCluskey, supra note 30, at 1.
32 CALCE recommends that a company using uprating have a well-developed
product liability prevention program, or an injured party's lawyer will be able to
exploit the facts concerning uprating activities in future lawsuits. See CALCE
News, Legal Issues of Uprating, Aug. 1999, at 3.
33 See id. Moisture saturation of a device may lead to liquid water, which ex-
pands when warmed and can instantaneously break apart a circuit. See PECHT,
supra note 5, at 174. This phenomenon is known as "popcorning." Id.
4 See APEM Course, supra note 25, at § 7 (stating that customers who are re-
ceiving avionics equipment with plastic parts include Boeing, Airbus, Douglas,
and other commuter and business aircraft manufacturers).
Risks associated with the use of components or systems outside the manufac-
turer's environmental specifications can be divided into three categories: reliabil-
ity of the die itself, reliability of the package, and the electrical performance of
the component or product. See Mark B. Wright, et al., Uprating Electronic Compo-
nents for Use Outside Their Temperature Specification Limits, 20 I.E.E.E. TRANSACTIONS
ON COMPONENTS, PACKAGING, AND MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY- PART A 252
(1997) [hereinafter Wright].
Issues which have at least been identified in the processes of uprating include
the following:
1) Is uprating a performance issue or a reliability issue?
2) How should samples be uprated for performance?
3) Should 100% of a lot [of parts] be uprated? Or is sampling
sufficient?
4) How are lot-to-lot variations addressed?
5) Does the act of uprating affect reliability?
6) What die level changes affect uprating and how are they
addressed?
7) What are the system level concerns with uprating?
8) Should uprating be combined with derating ? [Derating con-
cerns limitations on design because of expected environmental or
performance concerns.]
9) What is the legal liability? Who bears the burden?
10) Who should perform uprating?
Id. at 253.
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the importance of electronics performance and reliability in a
typical aviation application.
II. BACKGROUND
February 11, 1981, was a dark, stormy night at Westchester
County Airport in White Plains, New York.35 Because visibility
was limited by the weather, a Lockheed Jetstar business jet was
attempting an instrument landing approach.36 On board the
aircraft were two pilots and six passengers. The Jetstar had
four engines and four engine-mounted generators to supply the
electricity needed to operate the aircraft.3 8 As an added mea-
sure of reassurance for those onboard, White Plains was home
base for the pilots and the aircraft: Texasgulf Aviation, Inc.3 9
The aircraft (tail number N520S) and an identical sister ship
(tail number N320S) had been purchased by Texasgulf Aviation,
Inc. seven years earlier.4 0 Both aircraft were subsequently outfit-
ted with new Garrett jet engines. 41 Each engine was also
equipped with an electrical generator which generates the elec-
tricity needed to heat and light the craft, and to operate the
communications, navigation and electronic equipment.42 The
previous summer, N320S had been outfitted with new solid-state
generator control units (GCUs), which provide the basic func-
tion of regulating the electricity produced by the generators and
sensing voltage irregularities.43
The plane approaching its landing, N520S, had received its
new generator control units in January 1981. aa The Texasgulf
Aviation maintenance crew was capable of performing only mi-
35 Woodling, 813 F.2d at 554. Garrett is a subsidiary of AlliedSignal, Inc., Mor-
ristown, N.J. 3 DIR. OF CORP. AFFILIATIONS, 52-53 (1996).
36 See Woodling, 813 F.2d at 554.
37 See id. at 546.
38 See id. at 554.
39 See Texasguif, Inc. v. Colt Elecs. Co., Inc., 615 F. Supp. 648, 653 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
40 See id. at 651.
41 See id.
42 See id. A fifth generator, an auxiliary power unit (APU), generates power on
the ground when the aircraft engines are not running. See id.
43 See Texasgulf, Inc., 615 F. Suppl. At 651. A generator control unit (GCU)
controls the functioning and monitors the output of each electrical generator. A
GCU will typically contain several printed circuit boards and may have hundreds
of microcircuits, along with resistors, capacitors and other devices necessary for
proper functioning.
44 See id. at 652.
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nor maintenance.4 5 Therefore, the aircraft was sent to a facility
maintained by Garrett AiResearch at MacArthur Airport, Long
Island.46 There, the aircraft received extensive maintenance
and inspection, along with its new generator control units. 47
These particular GCUs were designed and manufactured by
Phoenix Aerospace, Inc., as part of a system installation package
for Garrett AiResearch. 48
The installation did not run smoothly. During one run-up of
the electrical systems while the aircraft was on the ground, the
number four generator tripped off line, and its GCU smoked.49
The GCU was replaced and the Garrett AiResearch crew ran
more tests.5 0 On the first two test flights, there were generator
trips and one instance when all four generators tripped off.5 1
Of course, sophisticated aircraft such as these generally have
battery back-ups. Using battery power, the GCUs were re-set
and the flight continued. 52 On a third test flight, the crew at-
tempted to overload the electrical system and force a trip, but
the system worked properly.53 Texasgulf Aviation's chief test pi-
lot, Jimmy Markham, accepted the aircraft on that day, January
31, 1981. 54
Markham later flew the aircraft to Chicago's Midway Airport.
During that flight, the number two generator tripped off twice
and was reset twice without difficulty.5 5 During the return flight
on February 3, the pilot experienced three generator trips dur-
ing his climb.5 6 Two were reset and the third was left off.57 Usu-
ally, one generator alone will provide sufficient power for flight-
essential equipment at least for short periods of time, and this
aircraft had four generators. Later in the flight, the same two
generators tripped off again, and were again reset." Markham




4s See Woodling, 813 F.2d at 546.
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ory, that he would not fly the aircraft again until the generator-
tripping situation was corrected. 9 Gregory was on the flight
heading to White Plains on the evening of February 11.60
The plane was flown and tested on February 5 and 6.6" Tech-
nicians from the GCU manufacturer (Colt) and the system inte-
grator (Phoenix) found wiring discrepancies on the aircraft, as
well as continued generator trippings.6 2 The Colt technician de-
clined to fly the aircraft. 63 On the last flight prior to February
11, the number two generator tripped and was reset.64 The re-
port made to Texasgulf Aviation was that the number two and
number three generator systems had certain faults, which were
to be corrected.65 The changes, however, would have required
removing the number two and number three engines, an opera-
tion beyond the normal maintenance capability of the Texasgulf
facility.6 6 The changes had not been made when the aircraft
took off on February 11.67
As the aircraft returned to Westchester County Airport on the
evening of February 11, all four GCUs tripped.68 Initially, the
batteries provided power to reset the generators and run the
essential equipment,69 but the GCUs continued to disconnect,
causing the batteries to deplete and finally exhaust.7" The FAA
report on this incident concluded that the final tripping oc-
curred when the plane was about 500 feet off the ground.7 ' The
plane crashed approximately 20 seconds later, a mile short of
the runway.7 2
59 See id. The other Jetstar, tail N320S, had "a few incidents of generator trip-
ping." Garrett repaired that aircraft. Id.
Texasgulf, Inc., 813 F.2d at 653.
hi See id. at 652-53.
62 See id. After consultation with Garrett, the technicians from Colt and Phoe-
nix corrected the wiring installation, performed by Garrett. See id.
63 See id. at 653.
64 See Texasgulf, Inc., 813 F.2d at 653.
65 See id. The technicians from Colt and Phoenix told the chief maintenance
technician of Texasgulf Aviation that the number two GCU should be replaced,
along with the number two ground fault transformer and the number three
ground fault sensor. See id.
66 See id.
67 See id.




72 See id. at 546, 554.
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Twenty-one related actions in litigation were born of this
tragic event.73 The story of the TexasgulfJetstar and its solid-
state GCUs provides an ideal setting for a discussion concerning
the reliability of electrical and electronic parts, particularly in
instances where they may constitute defective products."
III. THEORIES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Dean Prosser believed there were two types of defective condi-
tions that could result in a loss either to the purchaser or to a
third party.75 The first is a dangerous condition or product haz-
ard that may result in traffic accidents, industrial accidents,
medical mishaps or airplane crashes.76 The second refers to an
inferior condition of the product, that "may disappoint the pur-
chaser's expectations as to [the product's] efficacy or fitness for
73 See Gregory v. Garrett Corp., 578 F. Supp. 871, 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating
that those involved in the litigation included the decedents' families, estates and
employers, the United States government, and all corporations involved in the
design, manufacture, sale, installation, maintenance or inspection of the critical
aircraft components that may have caused the aircraft to crash).
74 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 1, § 1.
The Restatement begins by calling for liability of an explicitly commercial seller
or distributor when harm is caused by their defective products. "One engaged in
the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a
defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by
the defect." Id. On its face, this is different from the former Restatement for
products liability, section 402A:
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the
business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and
does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, supra note 13.
75 SeeW. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 95,
at 677 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER].
76 See id. at 677-78. Prosser further categorizes four different kinds of injuries
from the first condition. There may be personal injuries, physical harm to ob-
jects or property other than the defective product, physical harm to or destruc-
tion of the assembled product purchased by the first purchaser to use, and
physical harm to or destruction of a product that was constructed with or re-
paired with the seller's component part. See id. at 678.
"The economic loss doctrine precludes recovery in tort [of] economic dam-
ages caused by a defective product in the absence of personal injury or property
damage other than damage to the product itself." Virginia Sur. Co. v. American
Eurocopter Corp., 955 F. Supp. 1213, 1216 (D. Haw. 1996) (applying Hawaiian
law). "In such an instance, a party must recover under contract law." Id.
1999] 1211
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the purposes intended. '7 7 The second type is "likely to cause
only intangible economic losses. 7 8 In this paper, I will address
primarily the first type of defect, one that may lead to injury or
death. In this section, I explore three theories of liability avail-
able to aggrieved plaintiffs against the vendors of defective prod-
ucts: negligence in tort, strict liability in tort, and strict liability
in warranty.
A. THE GENESIS OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY- NEGLIGENCE
The first line of products liability cases arose due to defective
components beginning with MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 79 In
MacPherson, Buick Motor Co. sold an automobile to a dealer.
After the dealer sold the car to MacPherson, a wheel made from
defective wood collapsed. 0 The court found that the purchaser
had a cause of action against the manufacturer, even though
MacPherson had not purchased the automobile from the manu-
facturer."' The requirement of privity would have meant that
the liability of the manufacturer was limited to the dealer
alone.8 2 Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court of Appeals of
New York, found a general rule of product liability:
77 PROSSER, supra note 75, at 678. Prosser also mentioned direct economic loss
resulting from the purchase of an inferior product and consequential losses, such
as loss of profits. See id. He highlights an example of faulty plastic pipe which
must be replaced in a golf course irrigation system. See id. (citing Travelers In-
dem. Co. v. Evans Pipe Co., 432 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1970)).
A more recent case favoring contract law, rather than tort law, is McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Thiokol Corp., 124 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying Califor-
nia law). Upper-stage motors made by Thiokol may have been defective, result-
ing in two McDonnell Douglas' satellites failing to reach their desired orbit. See
id. at 1175. At trial, when McDonnell Douglas attempted to use a products liabil-
ity definition of "defect," the court found no reason to interpret the contract
between the parties to include the law of products liability "and all of the social
concerns regarding distribution of risk that it connotes." Id. at 1177.
78 PROSSER, supra note 75, at 678. For a further discussion on economic losses
in products liability actions, see Two Rivers Co. v. Curtiss Breeding Serv., 624 F.2d
1242 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981).
- 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) (Cardozo, J.).
80 See id. at 1051. "While the plaintiff was in the car it suddenly collapsed. He
was thrown out and injured. One of the wheels was made of defective wood, and
its spokes crumbled into fragments. The wheel was not made by the defendant; it
was bought from another manufacturer." Id.
81 See id. at 1053 (stating that when the consequences of negligence may be
foreseen in an unbroken chain of cause and effect, the duty to safeguard life and
limb does not arise from contract, but from the law).
82 See id. ("The dealer was indeed the one person by whom it might be said
with some approach to certainty that by him the car would not be used.").
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If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to
place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a
thing of danger.... If to the element of danger there is added
knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the
purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of con-
tract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to
make it carefully."3
MacPherson is generally regarded as the case that broke the
privity barrier in negligence cases. a4 Although the plaintiff still
had to prove negligence by the manufacturer, he was relieved
from having to allege and prove contractual privity.85
In a negligence case, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant
had a duty of care to the plaintiff, that the duty was breached,
that injury or damages resulted to the plaintiff, and that the
breach was the proximate cause of the injury or damages.8 6
Foreseeability is also an element of a products liability negli-
gence case. 7 As Justice Cardozo opined, "[w]e think that injury
83 Id. Justice Cardozo also foresaw the elements of testing and foreseeability,
even at this early stage (1916). In speaking of danger to persons other than the
buyer, he noted:
The proximity or remoteness of the relation is a factor to be consid-
ered. We are dealing now with the liability of the manufacturer of
the finished product, who puts it on the market to be used without
inspection by his customers. If he is negligent, where danger is to
be foreseen, liability will follow.
MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
Justice Cardozo also saw a concern for the parts-makers:
We are not required, at this time, to say that it is legitimate to go
back of the manufacturer of the finished product and hold the
manufacturers of the component parts. To make their negligence
a cause of imminent danger, an independent cause must often in-
tervene; the manufacturer of the finished product must also fail in
his duty of inspection. It may be that in those circumstances the
negligence of the earlier members of the series is too remote to
constitute, as to the ultimate user, an actionable wrong.
Id.
- SeejAmEs A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 565 (4th ed. 1994)
[hereinafter HENDERSON] (citing PROSSER, supra note 75, § 96 at 683, and stating
that the holding in MacPherson abrogated the privity requirement in negligence
cases, and had gained universal acceptance in the United States by 1966).
85 See id. (noting that the plaintiff still had to prove that negligence attributable
to the manufacturer caused a defect to be present, and that the defect was the
proximate cause of the product's breakdown and the plaintiff's injuries). The
text also hints that res ipsa loquitur arguments are available. See PROSSER, supra
note 75, at 683.
86 See id. at 164-65.
87 See HENDERSON, supra note 84, at 595-96 (stating that a plaintiff must show
that the resulting harm was within the range of foreseeable risks created by the
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to others is to be foreseen not merely as a possible, but as an
almost inevitable, result."8
MacPherson concerned injury to the actual purchaser of a de-
fective product. What happens in a products liability case if a
defective component causes injury to persons other than the
party purchasing the product?
B. THE COURTS FIND LIABILITY IN WARRANTY
In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., Mrs. Henningsen was
driving a new car her husband had given her as a Mother's Day
gift. 9 Only ten days and 468 miles after receiving the car, the
car veered off the road at a right angle to the direction it had
been traveling.9° Although Mrs. Henningsen had been driving
at a rate of only 20-22 miles per hour, the car was so badly dam-
aged that it was not possible to tell if any of the parts or work-
manship of the steering mechanism were defective. 91 The court
took judicial notice of the extensive advertising programs of au-
tomobile manufacturers, and noted that the "consumer" being
courted was not necessarily the buyer of the product.9 2 The
court explained that it was unfair to create demand with implied
defect, and that this requirement applies to negligence, warranty, and strict liabil-
ity in tort and product liability cases).
88 MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1054. Cardozo's observation of the foreseeability
requirement lives on in modern caselaw. See, e.g., Juno Indus., Inc. v. Bielawski,
701 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (finding no liability where a contractor
furnished a faulty 200-foot length of pipe, and the contractor specifically foresaw
the possibility of injury in the case of a defective product and required the pur-
chaser to test the pipe). The Florida court referred specifically to Justice Car-
dozo's example in MacPherson of a landlord who leases a tumble-down house to a
renter, whose guest subsequently is injured because of the poor condition of the
property. See id. at 1188. Cardozo believed that the landlord was not liable to the
injured guest because the tenant was under a duty of care to his guests-the
landlord legitimately expected the tenant to "test the product"-and thus the
tenant had a duty to test and repair the house. See id. See also Minton v. Krish,
642 A.2d 18, 22 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994) (holding that foreseeability of an injury
replaces the "completed and accepted" rule in actions for personal injury as a
result of a contractor's negligence).
89 161 A.2d 69, 73 (NJ. 1960).
90 See id. at 75.
91 See id. Experts at the trial opined that "something definitely went 'wrong
from the steering wheel down to the front wheels' and that the untoward hap-
pening must have been due to mechanical defect or failure . . . ." Id.
"'[Slomething down there had to drop off or break loose to cause the car' to act
in the manner described." Id.
92 See id. at 80-84.
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warranties, based on that advertising, and then limit a manufac-
turer's liability with a very restrictive express warranty.9"
The Supreme Court of New Jersey then found in favor of Mrs.
Henningsen, holding "that under modem marketing condi-
tions, when a manufacturer puts a new automobile in the stream
of trade and promotes its purchase by the public, an implied
warranty that it is reasonably suitable for use as such accompa-
nies it into the hands of the ultimate purchaser."" In this way,
the burden of losses caused by defective articles would be
"borne by those who [were] in a position to either control the
danger or make an equitable distribution of the losses when
they do occur."95 While this case did not mention the concept
of strict liability, there was not enough evidence to show fault on
the part of the dealer or the manufacturer. 6 Under the theory
of strict liability in warranty, it can be said "[t] he plaintiff [was]
no longer required to impugn the maker, but he was required
to impugn the product."9 7
For states choosing to recognize the MacPherson holding, a
negligence theory of products liability was now possible without
93 See Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 89, 92-93. The court also held that an implied
warranty of merchantability, from either the manufacturer or the dealer, extends
to the purchaser of the car, the members of his family, and to others occupying it
or using it with his consent. See id. at 79-80, 101-02. In formulating its holding,
the court noted great changes in distribution systems and contracting parties
from the early days of the common law until modern times. See id. at 77-78.
Echoing Cardozo's holding from MacPherson, the court also held that where the
commodities sold are such that if defectively manufactured they will be danger-
ous to life and limb, "then society's interests can only be protected by eliminating
the requirement of privity between the maker and his dealers and the reasonably
expected ultimate consumer." Id. at 81.
94 See id. at 84. The court treated foreseeability in a back-handed way. The
express warranty was a standardized form used by all members of the Automobile
Manufacturers Association, including General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, and five
smaller manufacturers. See id. at 87. The form could not be altered, and the
function of the dealer was merely ministerial-he was simply to deliver the war-
ranty. See Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 87. But the warranty was so artfully worded as
to be illusory. See id. at 79. The court noted that the terms of the warranty were a
"sad commentary" on the marketing practices of the automobile manufacturers,
in that the warranty had "metamorphosed" into a device to limit the manufac-
turer's liability. Id. at 78. The only reason to so insulate the manufacturers from
liability was the knowledge that defective products were not merely probable, but
certain to follow from the mass marketing of so many vehicles.
95 See id. at 81.
96 See id. at 75 (stating that "proof was not sufficient to make out a Prima facie
case as to the negligence of either the manufacturer or the dealer.").
97 W. Page Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J.
30, 33 (1973).
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privity. With Henningsen, states could also recognize a warranty
theory of strict liability for both buyers and ultimate consumers
of products.
C. STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT Is DISCOVERED
After negligence and warranty, a strict liability theory in tort
became available with the holding in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc.98 In Greenman, a man received a Shopsmith, a combi-
nation power tool for use in the home, from his wife.99 While
he was using the Shopsmith, a rotating piece of wood he was
turning (as in a lathe) "flew out of the machine and struck him
on the forehead, inflicting serious injuries."1 0 Consequently,
he sued both the retailer and the manufacturer. 10 1 At trial,
there was evidence of "defective design and construction of the
Shopsmith. 1 °2 The court submitted to the jury a cause of action
for breach of implied warranty against the retailer, and for negli-
gence and breach of express warranty against the
manufacturer. 103
The Supreme Court of California reviewed California statutes
and the common law on warranty, and found that, as a rule,
injured customers could not meet certain requirements in order
to bring court actions against manufacturers with whom they
had not dealt.104 However, the court found strict liability in tort
for the manufacturer "when an article he places on the market,
98 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). The California Supreme Court held that the man-
ufacturer's liability for defective products was "not one governed by the law of
contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort." Id. at 901. The court
held:
To establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient that plain-
tiff proved that he was injured while using the Shopsmith in a way it
was intended to be used as a result of a defect in design and manu-
facture of which plaintiff was not aware that made the Shopsmith
unsafe for its intended use.
Id.
99 Id. at 898.
100 Id.
10, See id.
102 Greenman, 377 P.2d at 899.
10- "Implicit in the machine's presence on the market... was a representation
that it would safely do the jobs for which it was built." Id. at 901.
104 See id., 377 P.2d at 900 (stating that the notice requirement, while a sound
rule as between commercial entities, becomes a booby trap when applied to a
consumer dealing with a remote seller). "The injured consumer is seldom
'steeped in the business practice which justifies the rule,' and at least until he has
had legal advice it will not occur to him to give notice to one with whom he has
had no dealings." Id. (citations omitted).
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knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects,
proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being. '10 5
With these cases, products liability no longer depended on
privity, nor was it limited by an express warranty from the manu-
facturer or dealer. The ultimate consumer was now protected,
and theories of negligence, warranty, and strict liability in tort
were all available by 1962. The next logical step after Greenman,
from the viewpoint of consumers, was the formulation of section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts regarding the spe-
cial liability of a seller for physical harm caused to the user or
consumer. 106
In sum, section 402A establishes strict liability in tort for de-
fective products found to be unreasonably dangerous. After
Henningsen and its progeny,10 7 a plaintiff may have a cause of
action for strict liability in warranty. A negligence theory is also
available after MacPherson and related cases." 8 An aggrieved
plaintiff thus has three theories of liability against vendors of
defective products: negligence in tort, strict liability in tort, and
strict liability in warranty. 10 9
105 Id. (noting that there was sufficient precedent in so many cases and vari-
eties of products as to warrant extending the rule to general applicability to all
products). Liability should be governed in these cases not by the law of contract
warranties, but by the law of strict liability in tort. See id. at 901. "The purpose of
such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective prod-
ucts are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather
than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves." Id.
106 See § 402A, supra note 13.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasona-
bly dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ulti-
mate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a prod-
uct, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is
sold.
Id.
107 See Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 69; Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 12 P.2d 409
(Wash. 1932) (holding a manufacturer liable for breach of express warranty de-
spite lack of privity).
108 See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1050; Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d
168 (Cal. 1964) (holding a manufacturer liable for breach of express warranty
despite lack of privity).
10- See PROSSER, supra note 75, §§ 96-98, at 681-94. Of course, products liability
law is state law, as is demonstrated by all these cases, and each state's legislature
and courts decide which theories to accept, if any.
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IV. PRODUCT DEFECTS
How is a product defective? There are three ways to consider
a product as being in a defective condition. There may be a flaw
in the product, also known as an abnormality or a condition that
was unintended, which makes the product more dangerous.1 1 °
Such a defect is termed a manufacturing defect.' The second
type of defect, a design defect, is one that makes a product un-
reasonably dangerous, not because of its unintended manufac-
turing flaws, but because of its failure to meet the consumer's
expectations. 1 2 Thirdly, a product may be unreasonably dan-
The difference between negligence and strict liability is demonstrated in a case
that concerned an electric company lineman burned from an electric arc. See
Bigham v.J.C. Penney Co., 268 N.W.2d 892 (Minn. 1978). The lineman claimed
that his injuries were aggravated by a "melt and cling" effect from the clothing he
wore, a cotton shirt and pants purchased from the defendant retailer. Id. at 895.
He claimed he should have been warned that his work clothes were flammable
and would produce a "melt and cling" effect if ignited. See id. The trial court
found that while he had assumed the risk of flash-over injuries, he had not as-
sumed the risk of having his burns aggravated by the clothes he was wearing. See
id.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld the jury's dual findings
that the work clothes were not in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous"
to the plaintiff, and that while Penney's had not breached a warranty, it was negli-
gent with respect to the flammability of the work clothes. Id. at 896. The court
found that the work clothing was not defective because it was not dangerous to
the average consumer; thus, there was no strict liability. See id. at 897. At the
same time, Penney's could also be found negligent because it sold flammable
clothing without warnings about its flammability. Bigham, 268 N.W. 2d at 898.
Thus, a manufacturer can be found negligent but not strictly liable in a product
liability case.
hO See PROSSER, supra note 75, § 99, at 695 (stating that a flaw "created in the
construction or marketing processes makes the product unreasonably dangerous
as a matter of law since it causes the product to be more dangerous than it was
designed to be").
'II See HENDERSON, supra note 84, at 561 (dividing a chapter on products liabil-
ity into three categories: manufacturing defects, design defects, and failure to
warn-the last now known as a "marketing failure").
112 See PROSSER, supra note 75, § 99, at 698-99. Two tests are noted, the "con-
sumer-contemplation" test and the "danger-utility" test. Id. A product may be
unreasonably dangerous by reason of a design defect under the "consumer-con-
templation test," if it is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchased it with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to the product's characteristics." Id. at
698 (citing § 402A, supra note 13, cmt i). Under the "danger-utility test," an item
"is defective as designed if, but only if, the magnitude of the danger outweighs
the utility of the product." Id. at 699.
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gerous if it has no warnings, or inadequate warnings, about a
risk or hazard related to the way the product is designed.113
A. MANUFACTURING DEFECT
The presence of a manufacturing defect is relatively easy to
determine. "[A] defective product is one that differs from the
manufacturer's intended result or from other ostensibly identi-
cal units of the same product line."' 14 A manufacturing defect,
then, can be treated by a simple "deviation from the norm"
test.115 Applying this test to MacPherson, the wheel which broke
and caused the injury had a manufacturing defect. 116 In a com-
parison to other ostensibly identical units of the same product
line, the Imperial Wheel Company of Flint, Michigan as Buick's
supplier, had furnished 80,000 good wheels prior to this
incident.117
An analysis of MacPherson also reveals the elements necessary
to make a case of negligence. The court found that Buick was
under a duty of care, 1 8 and that "[i] t was not at liberty to put
the finished product on the market without subjecting the com-
113 See id. at 697 (stating that "[t] here will be no liability without showing that
the defendant designer knew or should have known . . . of the risk[s] or haz-
ard[s] about which he failed to warn.").
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability explicitly categorizes the
three types of defects in section 2: "Categories of Product Defect. A product is
defective when, at the time of sale of distribution, it contains a manufacturing
defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate instructions or
warnings." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 1,
§ 2.
114 Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal. 1978) (stating that
"when a product comes off the assembly line in a substandard condition," there is
a manufacturing defect). The Supreme Court of California gave, as an example,
one machine out of a million, which contains a cracked or broken part. See id. at
445. The Restatement (Third) states that a product "contains a manufacturing
defect when the product departs from its intended design even though all possi-
ble care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product." RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 1, § 2(a).
115 Barker, 573 P.2d at 454.
116 See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1051 (stating that "[o]ne of the wheels was
made of defective wood, and its spokes crumbled into fragments.").
117 See id. at 1055 (Bartlett, C.J., dissenting) (noting that Buick had relied on
Imperial Wheel Co., a reputable manufacturer, to "make all necessary tests as to
the strength of the material therein, and made no such test itself").
118 See id. at 1053 (stating that "it]he manufacturer of (a] thing of danger is
under a duty to make it carefully").
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ponent parts to ordinary and simple tests."11 9 The duty was
breached by the failure of the manufacturer to inspect the
wheel and by placing a defective product on the market. As a
result, the defect caused an injury.120 Justice Cardozo made sev-
eral interesting comments regarding the potential liability of the
wheel component manufacturer. To make a case against Impe-
rial, he stated, and its undoubted negligence in furnishing a de-
fective wheel, the company could conceivably claim an
intervening, independent cause: the negligence of its customer,
Buick. 121 This view has found some support,122 and does not
contradict section 402A. 121 Foreseeability of harm is a part of
the causation element under the rule that if a seller is negligent
where danger is foreseeable, liability will follow.' 24 The court
noted that the manufacturer knew persons other than the buyer
would use the car.125
The principles of products liability and negligence an-
nounced in MacPherson are still good law, as illustrated in the
recent Florida case, Juno Indus., Inc. v. Bielawski.126 As a pipe
manufacturer, Juno joined several segments together to form a
200-foot long section to be used as part of its customer's con-
119 See id. at 1055 (explaining that "[t]he defendant was not absolved from a
duty of inspection because it bought the wheels from a reputable
manufacturer").
120 See id. at 1053 (noting that there was "no break in the chain of cause and
effect").
121 See id.
122 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kolisman Instrument Corp., 191 N.E.2d 81, 83 (N.Y.
1963) (holding that it is not necessary to extend rules of liability to component
manufacturers in a warranty action).
123 The "caveat" immediately following section 402A states that the American
Law Institute expresses no opinion as to whether section 402A may apply to the
seller of a component part of a product to be assembled. The Restatement
(Third) makes it clear that the matter has been resolved to hold liable compo-
nents manufacturers who furnish defective components. RESTATEMENT (THIR)
OF ToRTs: PRODUCTS LIABI=rr, supra note 1, § 2(b).
124 See MacPherson, 111 N.E.2d at 1053 (stating that when a manufacturer of a
finished product places it on the market to be used by his customers without
inspection, and "is negligent where danger is to be foreseen, a liability will
follow").
125 Id. (stating that the automobile had seats for three persons). Dismissing
the argument of privity, the court noted that the dealer was the one person cer-
tain not to use the car, and that MacPherson had purchased the car from a Buick
dealer. Id. at 1053.
126 701 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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struction project. 127 The written contract between the buyer
and Juno specified a testing procedure to determine the
strength of the pipe and the welds.' 2  The buyer did not follow
this procedure, and one of the buyer's workers was killed. 29
The trial court found that there was no negligence on the part
of the manufacturer, because the defect in the weld, certainly a
manufacturing defect, was not the proximate cause of the
worker's death. 30
The Florida appeals court considered whether to uphold the
trial court's finding that Juno was 5% liable upon a theory of
strict liability. 3' The court found that strict liability is justified
only when the purchaser is entitled to expect that a product
placed in the stream of commerce has been tested and in-
spected (or properly labeled) to assure that it is safe for human
use.'3 2 Since the required testing was so well spelled out to the
purchaser, the appellate court concluded that this was not a case
of strict liability, and reversed in Juno's favor.' 3
B. DESIGN DEFECT
Design defects may be detected by two tests, the "consumer-
contemplation" test and the "risk-utility" test.'34 Under the
"consumer-contemplation" test, a product is defectively
designed if it is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the com-
munity as to that product's characteristics."' 35 This test, as ar-
ticulated by section 402A, contemplates an "ordinary consumer"
127 See id. at 1189 (noting that this was large pipe, 22" in diameter, which was
not inherently dangerous, but that if the testing was not conducted properly, it
could be hazardous).
128 See id. at 1188.
1 See id. at 1189 (stating that the test specifications required pressure testing
with water, not air, and recommended that the trench holding the pipe be back-
filled before the test). The user did not follow these recommendations and in-
structed his employees to stand beside the pipe to listen for leaks. See id. When
one weld failed, the pipe thrashed around, killing the employee. See id.
1s0 See id. at 1190.
131 See id. at 1189.
132 See Juno, 701 So.2d at 1189.
133 See id.
134 See PROSSER, supra note 75, § 99, at 698-99.
135 § 402A, supra note 13, cmt. i. An example given is that "good tobacco is not
unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking are harmful, but
tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous."
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with "ordinary knowledge," not a "foreseeable user," which
would unreasonably extend liability." 6
The other test, the "risk-utility" test, arose because critics per-
ceived the consumer-contemplation test as too restrictive on
manufacturer's liability.13 7 The risk-utility test for a design de-
fect focuses on whether, in light of the relevant factors, the ben-
efits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger
inherent in the design. 3 The tests may be summarized as a
dual standard to assure that a plaintiff is protected from "prod-
ucts that either fall below ordinary consumer expectations as to
safety, or that, on balance, are not as safely designed as they
should be.' 139 The Restatement (Third) of Torts favors the
"risk-utility" test when it defines a design defect in terms of the
"foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product," and requires a
showing of a "reasonable alternative design" whose omission
renders the product not reasonably safe. 140
The "risk-utility" test debuted in Barker, where a worker, who
was not accustomed to working with a high-lift loader, at-
136 Todd v. Societe Bic, S.A., 21 F.3d 1409 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 513 U.S. 947 (1994) (noting that a child is certainly a foreseeable user of
dangerous objects, but refusing to make manufacturers absolutely liable, and
thus insurers of their products).
137 See Barker, 573 P.2d at 451.
138 See id. at 451-52 (stating that the plaintiff must prove that the product's
design proximately caused the injury).
139 Id. at 446-47. The court also noted that the product's "reasonably foresee-
able" use is part of any defectiveness evaluation, rather than its "intended use."
Id. at n.9. Note the distinction: the manufacturer is responsible for reasonably
foreseeable uses, but not foreseeable users. Under the facts of this case, a reason-
able and prudent man might characterize the plaintiffs use of the product as
"misuse." However, a plaintiffs misuse is not a defense in a strict liability case.
SeeJurado v. Western Gear Works, 619 A.2d 1312, 1317 (N.J. 1993) (applying N.J.
law, noting that the absence of misuse is to be part of the plaintiffs case, and that
the "plaintiff has the burden of showing that there was no misuse or that the
misuse was objectively foreseeable"). The court in Jurado goes on to note two
kinds of misuse: one is use for an improper purpose, such as using a power saw
for clipping one's nails; the other is for use in an improper manner, such as when
a high-lift forklift is operated on a steep slope instead of level terrain. See id. at
1318.
140 A product:
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed
by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adop-
tion of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distrib-
utor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and
the omission of the alternative design renders the product not rea-
sonably safe.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 1, §2(b).
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tempted to lift a load of lumber to a height of 18-20 feet above
the ground.1 41 The worker used the levelers provided on the
loader because the ground at that location sloped sharply in sev-
eral directions.142 As the load went above 10 feet high, he felt a
vibration, and his co-workers shouted to him that the load was
beginning to tip and that he should jump.1 48 He jumped, and
was injured when struck by a piece of falling lumber.144 In its
analysis, the court reviewed the consumer-expectation test as un-
satisfactory, since in many instances "a consumer would not
know what to expect because he would have no idea how safe a
product could be made.' 45
The court noted several factors that could be weighed in eval-
uating designs:
the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the
likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical feasibil-
ity of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an improved
design, and the adverse consequences to the product and to the
consumer that would result from an alternative design.' 46
While the loader was equipped with levelers, there were several
other features that would have made it a much safer design. 147
141 573 P.2d at 447. The regular user called in sick that day, knowing that the
high-lift loader was not safe for that use, which he believed was more suited to a
crane. See id. at 448, n.2. The supervisor was so informed but had not agreed to
obtain a crane for such lifting. See id.
142 See id. at 447.
143 See id.
4 See id.
145 Id. at 454 (citingJohn Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products,
44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973)).
146 Barker, 573 P.2d at 455. The court also discussed how to allocate the bur-
den of proof, noting that the feasibility and cost of alternative designs are often
"technical matters peculiarly within the knowledge of the manufacturer." Id. at
455.
Barker has been criticized for shifting the burden of proof for the risk-utility
analysis. SeeJames A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus
on Defective Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 867, 900 (1998). The authors note
that "most American legal scholars agree that the general standard for defective
design is the risk-utility analysis together with a requirement of proof of a reason-
able alternative design." Id. at 901. Henderson and Tweski are the reporters for
the American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
(1998). See id. at 901-2 & n.142. This standard is not "codified." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 140, § 2(b).
147 See Barker, 573 P.2d at 447-48. The plaintiffs expert witness testified that
the loader was unstable because of its "relatively narrow base" and the height to
which loads were expected to reach. Id. The plaintiff's expert further indicated
that "the loader should have been equipped with 'outriggers,' mechanical
arms.., to lend stability to the loader." Id. at 448. The loader was also defective
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The court thus found that the risk-utility test could be applied to
questions of design defect.14 a
To illustrate the difference in the tests, note that the con-
sumer-expectation test would have failed the plaintiff in Barker.
The "ordinary consumer" in Barker might be the usual operator
or the foreman, both of whom were skilled in the operation of
the high-load lift.'49 Their ordinary knowledge, common to the
community, was that the loader was entirely unsafe for the at-
tempted task .15o The issue was whether the product was defec-
tively designed so as to be "unreasonably dangerous for its
intended use." 51 When this question was submitted to the trial
jury, it rendered a 10-2 verdict in favor of the defendants. 5 2
The California Supreme Court looked at other cases and com-
mentary, and decided to relax the requirements so as to include
the risk-utility test as well. 5 ' As a result, the court remanded the
case on the issue of whether the design was defective under the
risk-utility test, as well as whether the loader was defective for
"reasonably foreseeable uses," rather than its "intended uses."1"4
Application of these tests requires some discretion. The nar-
rower consumer-contemplation test is generally used "when a
simple product which poses an obvious danger is alleged to be
defective."' 5  Under Illinois law, for instance, the courts have
decided there are limited situations in which the broader risk-
utility test can be applied.'56 It is only incumbent upon to the
court, as a matter of law, to decide whether a product is "sim-
in that it did not have roll bars or seat belts, "essential to protect the operator in
the event that the machine rolled over." Id. The plaintiff characterized the lack
of this equipment as a proximate cause of the injury, on the grounds that if the
loader had such equipment, he could have remained in the loader and escaped
injury. See id. The defective design of the leveling equipment, and its lack of an
automatic locking mechanism, may also have been a proximate cause of the acci-
dent. See id.
148 See Barker, 573 P.2d at 457-58.
149 See id. at 451.
150 See id. at 448 n.2.
151 Id. at 449 n.4. Note that it was error for the trial court to specify "intended
use," rather than "reasonably foreseeable use." Id. at 458.
152 See id. at 449.
153 See Barker, 573 P.2d at 456.
154 Id. at 458.
15 Haddix v. Playtex Family Prods. Corp., 138 F.3d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 1998).
156 See id. (quoting Scoby v. Vulcan-Hart Corp., 569 N.E. 2d 1147, 1151 (Ill.
App. 1991) for the proposition that "a line must be drawn beyond which the
danger-utility (i.e., risk-utility) test cannot be applied").
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ple. ' 157 Thus, in a case involving tampon use , that caused toxic
shock syndrome to an Illinois user, the court decided it was a
simple product; therefore, the consumer-contemplation test ap-
plied, and the dangers were obvious to users. 158 The court's de-
cision was due at least in part to the warnings on every box of
tampons, as required by federal regulations. 159 While the dan-
ger might not be obvious, the court recognized that the ultimate
effects were made obvious by the warnings. 160
Components of products may also be defectively designed, as
illustrated by a case involving an aircraft speed indicator.'61 In
Moorhead, the pilot encountered icing conditions, causing the
aircraft to lose airspeed, spin out of control and crash. 62 The
district court found that the plane's airspeed indicator was par-
tially responsible for the accident. 63 The indicator had frozen
during the flight, causing the indicated speed to increase with
altitude.16 4 The aircraft manufacturer and the National Trans-
portation Safety Board (NTSB), after encountering similar mal-
functions, had issued advisory warnings. 65 The appellate court
noted that there were alternate designs for this airspeed indica-
tor, and therefore left undisturbed the district court's finding of
defective design.' 66
C. DEFECT IN MARKETING OR FAILURE TO WARN
A product can be deemed defective by its failure to warn, or
failure to warn adequately, of a risk or hazard related to the
product's design.' 67 Prosser takes the view that in an action
against a manufacturer-designer, the proof must include negli-
gence. This flows from the plaintiff's need to show that the
manufacturer-designer knew or should have known, in the exer-
157 Id. (citing Scaccianoce v. Hixon Mfg. & Supply Co., 57 F.3d 582, 586 (7th
Cir. 1995)).
158 See id. at 686.
159 See id.
-6 See id. In agreement, the court here noted that the Ninth Circuit had ruled
similarly on the same facts. See id. (citing Papike v. Timbrands, Inc., 107 F.3d 737
(9th Cir. 1997)).
161 See Moorhead v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int'l, Inc., 828 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1987)
(applying Texas law).
162 Id. at 281.
163 See id. at 284.
-6 See id.
- See id. at 284 n.27.
1 See id. at 284 (noting that there were modifications which might have cor-
rected problems with the airspeed indicating system).
167 See PROSSER, supra note 75, § 99, at 697.
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cise of ordinary care, of the risk or hazard of which he failed to
warn.' 68 When a manufacturer or seller "markets without ade-
quate warnings, [however,] a reseller is subject to liability [even]
without negligence in reselling the product without adequate
warning."'69 A most contentious issue in "failure to warn" cases
has been whether a manufacturer is liable for warnings of risks
which were unknown or unknowable at the time of manufac-
ture. 170 Section 402A itself marks some limits on the seller's ob-
ligations to warn, and, in fact, finds no need to warn of common
dangers or dangers generally known.171
The chief exception to the duty to warn is the unknown and
unknowable risk. 17 2 Neither is there a duty to warn of open and
obvious dangers."7 However, a defect in a product cannot be
168 See id.
169 Id.
170 See id. at 697-98 (stating "it would seem to be extending strict liability too far
to require a manufacturer to bear the costs of accidents to a few who were victim-
ized by an unknowable risk of a good product that was a boon to mankind- such
as when penicillin was first marketed").
171 See § 402A, supra note 13, cmt.j (noting that a seller will not be required to
warn persons of foods causing common allergies, on the grounds that they will
have knowledge of them). Section 402A also notes there will be a duty to warn of
dangers not generally known, or which a consumer would not reasonably expect
to find in the product, if the seller knows, or should have known, of the danger.
See id.
The Restatement (Third) takes foreseeability into account. A product:
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could
have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable in-
structions or warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a prede-
cessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of
the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably
safe.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY, supra note 1, § 2.(c).
172 See Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 556 (Cal.
1991) (citing Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988) for the proposi-
tion that knowledge or knowability is a component of strict liability for failure -to
warn, and a defendant in such a case may present evidence of the state of the art,
i.e., that the particular risk was neither known or knowable with the scientific
knowledge available at the time of manufacture or distribution).
173 See Clark v. Boeing Co., 395 So. 2d 1226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). In Clark,
a stewardess opened a door on ajet aircraft while its engines were running, caus-
ing trauma to herself from the noise and from jet fuel emissions. Id. at 1228.
The court found that the aircraft manufacturer had no duty to warn individuals
of an obvious danger. See id. at 1228-29. The court found that the aircraft was
not defectively designed for lack of a door interlock which would have prevented
opening while the engines were running; therefore, there is no duty to consum-
ers to supply materials which could be made safer, when the danger to be
avoided is obvious to all. See id.
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overcome by a mere warning. 174 Under Comment j to section
402A, a seller is entitled to the presumption that his warnings
will be read and heeded. 175 The question may then arise as to
the adequacy of a given warning. 176
174 See Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations,
41 UCLA L. REv. 1193, 1206 (1994) [hereinafter Latin] (citing Skyhook Corp. v.
Jasper, 560 P.2d 934 (N.M. 1977), overruled by Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp., 824
P.2d 297 (N.M. 1992)). Injasper, the court found that a crane, which "could have
been insulated against electric shock," was sufficiently safe if the manufacturers
warned users not to come close to high-voltage power lines. Jasper, 560 P.2d at
938. In Klopp, an airline passenger going through a metal detector tripped over
its stanchion base and sustained injuries. 824 P.2d at 295. Klopp overruled jasper,
holding that "[an] occupier of premises cannot avoid liability ... for injuries
caused by dangers that otherwise may be made safe through reasonable means."
Id. at 297.
One rationale for requiring manufacturers to actually mitigate dangers, rather
than to depend on warnings, is that warnings often prove ineffective. See Latin,
supra, at 1206. Latin contends that a manufacturer chooses either to make a
product safer or to add warnings which require consumers to protect themselves
or others who use the product. See id. at 1196. The danger in adding warnings
lies in the consumer's failure to read them, his difficulty in understanding these
admonitions, and a general failure to follow warning or directions given. See id.
at 1196, 1207, 1220, 1242. Latin's explanation for the consumer's failure to read
the warnings includes functional illiteracy, inattentive or incompetent users, un-
available or misplaced directions, reliance on intermediaries, reliance on general
knowledge or experience, and information overload. See id. at 1207-15.
175 See § 402A, supra note 13 cmt.j (stating that a product with such a warning,
which is safe for use if followed, is neither defective nor dangerous ). This is no
longer consistent with case law. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. Sec-
tion 2 of the Restatement (Third) appears to extend this protection, in that a
product is deemed to have a design defect "when the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a
reasonable alternative design ... and the omission of the alternative design ren-
ders the product not reasonably safe." David Owen, Products Liability Law Restated,
49 S.C. L. REv. 273, 281 (1998) (citing American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 2(b) (Proposed Final Draft 1997)).
The section expands to include liability for the seller, the distributor or other
predecessors in the commercial chain of distribution. See id. A product with a
defect carrying a "foreseeable risk of harm" may be one which causes a manufac-
turer or seller to foresee danger so much as to add a warning. See Latin, supra
note 174, at 1196 (stating that manufacturers choose either safer designs or
"good" warnings). If a manufacturer is able to warn of a danger, it follows that he
must have foreseen the danger.
176 SeeJaurequi v.John Deere Co., 971 F. Supp. 416, 419 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (ap-
plying Missouri law) (where the plaintiff claimed that the warning on a corn head
was inadequate); see also Latin, supra note 174, at 1195. Latin notes that "product
warnings and other disclosure mechanisms can be effective only when intended
recipients are able to receive, comprehend, and act upon the information im-
parted." Id. Latin emphasizes several reasons why consumers do not understand
warnings. These include imperfect tradeoffs in a warning among details, the clar-
ity and impact of the warning, textual ambiguity, uncertainty concerning the con-
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A seller may still be liable for post-sale warning of his product
when defects are discovered at a later time. For example, in
cases involving helicopter engines, a duty exists to warn purchas-
ers of a product's defect.1 77 It is generally accepted that knowl-
edge or knowability is a necessary component in failure-to-warn
cases. 78 Strict liability, on the other hand, would not concern
itself with such conduct by the seller, that is, whether the seller
knew or should have known.179  Failure-to-warn cases, then,
bounded by the defendant's knowledge or knowability, are
much more about negligence than strict liability, but in these
cases, the distinction lacks serious difference.18 0 Thus, in a fail-
ure-to-warn case, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
sequences of misuse, inadequate expertise necessary to evaluate the warning,
variations in individual capabilities, and cognitive heuristics and biases (e.g.,
when an individual uses simplified strategies and biases which lead to mistakes in
evaluation). See id. at 122040.
177 See Walton v. Avco Corp., 610 A.2d 454, 459 (Pa. 1992) (applying Penn-
sylvania law in a case wherein Avco sold engines to Hughes Helicopter, Inc. for
use in helicopters). When Avco became aware of the defect in the engines, it
issued a service instruction to Hughes detailing the defect and corrective action.
See id. at 456. Hughes failed to pass the warning on to its helicopter consumers,
and thus incurred liability not only for incorporating a defective engine, but also
for failing to forward the warning: "Having been informed of [the] defect,
Hughes was required to warn its service centers and, more importantly, those
who purchased the affected helicopters." Id. at 459. The court further noted the
special property of helicopters in that they are not mass-produced objects which
may be "swept away" in the stream of commerce, but are sold in specialized mar-
kets. Id. The court found it important that Avco, the manufacturer of the defec-
tive component, had consistently maintained contact with Hughes for the very
purpose of keeping Hughes current on all pertinent information, presumably so
that Hughes could fulfill its duty to warn its customers. See id.
178 See Anderson, 810 P.2d at 556. Only Louisiana, Missouri, Pennsylvania and
Washington have rejected knowability as a condition of strict liability. See id. at
554 n.100.
179 See id. at 562 (Mosk,J., dissenting). Justice Mosk argues that the principles
of strict liability are diluted when a defendant's conduct, and thereby his negli-
gence, are brought into the argument. See id. He contends that California will
no longer have strict liability for failure to warn under the "state of the art" rule,
but rather only a negligence claim will remain. See id. He also notes that "one
characteristic that distinguishes strict liability from negligence is proof of actual
or constructive knowledge of risk," and that negligence cases focus on the de-
fendant, while strict liability cases focus on the product. Id. (citing Kearl v. Led-
erle Lab., 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 832 (1985), rev'd on other grounds, Brown, 751
P.2d at 482).
180 See Anderson, 810 P.2d at 563 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (stating the possibility
that failure to warn cases may be based solely on negligence); see alsoJames A.
Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The
Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265 (1990).
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knew or should have known that the product was dangerous, yet
failed to warn the buyer.'
With the development of all these theories of liability, a plain-
tiff could now bring suit in any number of ways. One author
might have imagined products liability plaintiffs:
as a swarm of flies in vintage time,
About the wine-press where sweet must is poured,
Beat off, returns as oft with humming sound;
Or surging waves against a solid rock,
Though all to shivers dashed, the assault renew,
Vain battery, and in froth or bubbles end.18 2
V. APPLICATION OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
TO "UPRATED" ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS
A. LIABILITY OF COMPONENTS MANUFACTURERS
The Restatement (Third) itself is possibly the strongest de-
fense against liability of components manufacturers, contending
that they should not be liable when their components are not
defective.' In other words, liability should limit itself to cases
where the components themselves are defective, or where the
component manufacturer "substantially participates in the inte-
gration of component[s] into the design of [other] prod-
181 See Anderson, 810 P.2d at 558-59; Dixon v. Jacobsen Mfg. Co., 637 A.2d 915,
921 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1994) (applying New Jersey law).
182 JOHN MILTON, PARADISE REGAINED, Book IV in The Portable Milton 591-92, 11
15-20 (1671).
183 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LnasIluv, supra note 1, § 5 cmt.
a. Section 5 states:
Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor of Product Compo-
nents for Harm Caused by Products Into Which Components are
Integrated
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing
product components who sells or distributes a component is sub-
ject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by a prod-
uct into which the component is integrated if:
(a) the component is defective in itself, as defined in this
Chapter, and the defect causes the harm; or
(b) (1) the seller or distributor of the component substan-
tially participates in the integration of the component into the
design of the product; and
(2) the integration of the component causes the product to be
defective, as defined in this Chapter; and
(3) the defect in the product causes the harm.
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ucts."1 4 Comment a of section 5, touching on the rationale for
liability of components manufacturers, calls it "unjust and ineffi-
cient to impose liability solely on the ground that the manufac-
turer of the integrated product utilizes the component in a
manner that renders the integrated product defective."18 5
It is generally recognized that electronic parts manufacturers
do not produce the end items, which are either used in industry
or purchased by the consumer. A chain of suppliers with ac-
companying responsibility is usually established, and may in-
clude piece part manufacturers,"8 6 intermediaries who furnish
avionics equipment to airplane manufacturers,18 7 equipment in-
tegrators or outfitters,""8 as well as aircraft manufacturers them-
selves."8 9 The supposition is that electrical or electronic parts
184 Id. Comment e states that substantial participation can take many forms,
but "[w] hen the component seller substantially participates in the design of the
integrated product," it is fair and reasonable to hold the component seller re-
sponsible for the harm caused by the defective, integrated product. Id. at § 5
cmt. e. This does not, however, include liability for a component seller whose
participation is limited to responsively designing a component to the buyer's ex-
pectations. See id.
Comment e further notes that those who merely provide "mechanical or tech-
nical services or advice concerning a component part" do not engage in the sub-
stantial participation necessary to subject the component supplier to liability. Id.
"One who provides a design service alone, as distinct from combining the design
function with the sale of a component, generally is liable only for negligence, and
is not treated as a product seller." Id.
185 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 1, § 5 cmt.
a. Comment f notes that "the mere fact that the component seller participates in
the integration of a component into the design of a product," does not subect
the seller to liability unless the integration causes the product to be defective and
the resulting defect causes the plaintiff's harm. Id. at § 5 cmt. f. The reporters
use as an example a valve manufacturer who redesigns a valve so that it can be
integrated into a particular kind of tank. If the tank then fails due to reasons
unrelated to the valve installation, the component seller of is not liable under
§ 5(b).
186 See Wright, supra note 34, at 255 (noting that manufacturers are "not willing
to take on the legal liability related to subsequent use of [their] components in a
temperature regime where [they have] not expended the test resources necessary
to ensure the components will perform adequately").
187 See id. (distinguishing between subassembly suppliers, assembly suppliers,
and system integrators, and noting that as the level of integration increases, the
options available to the supplier increase, such as the option of cooling the parts
in question).
188 Recall Colt and Phoenix in Woodling, 813 F.2d at 543.
189 See APEM course, supra note 25, § 8 (stating that air transport avionics is
essentially a commercial enterprise centered on plastic-encapsulated-microcir-
cuits, and listing commercial and business aircraft customers who purchase avion-
ics equipment made with such components).
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warranted by the manufacturer for 0-70'C operation and storage
are being used in conditions where the temperature range may
extend below 0°C or above 70'C. A further supposition is that
the users test at least some of the parts for their suitability at
conditions which exceed the 0-700C range (such as -40 to
+850C). 190
190 Many testing schemes exist, among them the military standards. See, e.g.,
U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MIISTD-202F, TEST METHOD STANDARD ELECTRONIC AND
ELECTRICAL COMPONENT PARTS, (1998); U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MIL-STD-750D,
TEST METHODS FOR SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES (1996). Other organizations em-
ploying test standards include the Electronic Industries Association, publisher of
JOINT ELECTRON DEVICES ENGINEERING COUNCIL [JEDEC] standards, such as
JESD22-A1 12, MOISTURE-INDUCED STRESS SENSITIVITY FOR PLASTIC SURFACE MOUNT
DEVICES (1994). See also RADIO TECHNICAL COMMISSION FOR AERONAUTICS, RTCA/
DO-160C, ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS AND TEST PROCEDURES FOR AIRBORNE
EQUIPMENT (1989) [hereinafter DO-160C]. This document outlines a series of
tests to provide a laboratory means to determine performance characteristics of
airborne equipment under environmental conditions representative of those
which may be encountered in flight.
While such methods are useful, most manufacturers and users of electronic
and electrical devices who consume piece parts in generating next-higher assem-
blies have distinct methods of testing and qualifying the pieces they consume and
manufacture. "The organization best suited to performing uprating is the com-
ponent manufacturer. The manufacturer has the design rules, knows the tem-
perature range for which the components are designed, and has the production
test vectors and equipment needed for functional and parametric testing to eval-
uate performance." Wright, supra note 34, at 255.
While the manufacturer may be the party best able to "uprate" components,
manufacturers are not often willing to take on legal liability related to the use of
components in a temperature regime where they have not expended the test
resources necessary to ensure adequate performance. See id. There are greater
costs associated with specifying components for use over an extended tempera-
ture range, including reduced device performance over the wider temperature
range, greater marketing commitment, costlier testing, and increased warranty
costs. See id. "A manufacturer who chooses not to sell components in the military
temperature range has made a business decision not to incur these costs but
rather to direct resources to other areas." Id.
One manufacturer handles the situation this way, as illustrated in its title page
for a catalog on Dynamic RAM data devices:
Motorola makes no warranty, representation or guarantee regard-
ing the suitability of its products for any particular purpose, nor
does Motorola assume any liability arising out of the application or
use of any product or circuit, and specifically disclaims any and all
liability, including without limitation consequential or incidental
damages. "Typical" parameters can and do vary in different appli-
cations. All operating parameters, including "Typicals" must be val-
idated for each customer application by customer's technical
experts .... Motorola products are not designed, intended, or au-
thorized for use as components in systems intended for surgical im-
plant into the body, or other applications intended to support or
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A manufacturer is liable strictly in tort for a defective product
that is unreasonably dangerous. He is also liable for breaching a
warranty of suitability for fitness and purpose, and is liable in
negligence for a breach of any duty of care to his customers. 191
Thus, a manufacturer who sells a product with a manufacturing
design, or marketing defect, may be liable under several theo-
ries of products liability. 192
sustain life, or for any other application in which the failure of the
Motorola product could create a situation where personal injury or
death may occur. Should Buyer purchase or use Motorola products
for any such unintended or unauthorized application, Buyer shall
indemnify and hold Motorola and its officers, employees, subsidiar-
ies, affiliates, and distributors harmless against all claims, costs,
damages, and expenses, and reasonable attorney fees arising out of,
directly or indirectly, any claim of personal injury or death associ-
ated with such unintended or unauthorized use, even if such claim
alleges that Motorola was negligent regarding the design or manu-
facture of the part.
MOTOROLA CORP., DYNAMic RAMs & MEMORY MODULES (catalogue 1993).
191 See PROSSER, supra note 75, §§ 96-98, at 681-94. Because manufacturers are
anxious to reduce any liability for their products, and virtually all manufacturers
of semiconductor or electrical products have warnings and disclaimers in their
literature, if not placed directly on their products. These warnings can be com-
plicated, but may also be as simple as the following two examples:
Information in this document is provided solely to enable use of
Intel products. Intel assumes no liability whatsoever, including in-
fringement of any patent or copyright, for sale and use of Intel
products except as provided in Intel's Terms and Conditions of
Sale for such products.
Intel Corporation makes no warranty for the use of its products and
assumes no responsibility for any errors which may appear in this
document nor does it make a commitment to update the informa-
tion contained herein.
INTEL CORP., AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCrS DATABOOK (catalogue 1995).
No warranty or guarantee, expressed or implied is made regarding
the capacity, performance or suitability of any product. We reserve
the right to make changes in these specifications at any time and
without notice, in order to supply the best possible product ....
SEMIKRON does not recommend the use of its semiconductors in
life support applications where such use may directly threaten life
or injure due to device failure or malfunction. Users of SEMJKRON
semiconductors in life support applications, who have not come to
an agreement with SEMIKRON in respect of all parameters, assume
all risks of such use and indemnify SEMIKRON against all damages
resulting from such use.
SEMIKRON INT'L, PARTNER FOR POWER ELECTRONICS (catalogue 1996).
192 See PROSSER, supra note 75, § 99, at 694-702. Of course, the component
manufacturer can only be liable under the Restatement (Third) if the products
he furnishes are defective, or if after he substantially participates in the integra-
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In order to prove a claim for a products liability action in
strict liability, a plaintiff must establish that:
1) the defendant sold the product in the course of its business; 2)
the product was then in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous when put to a reasonably anticipated use; 3) the product
was used in a manner reasonably anticipated; and 4) the plaintiff
was injured as a direct result of such defective condition as ex-
isted when the product was sold.193
If the claim for strict liability is one for failure to warn, the
elements of the cause of action must also allege that the plaintiff
was injured as a direct result of the failure to warn.194 Causation
has two requirements: "1) The product for which there was no
warning must have caused plaintiff's injuries; and 2) the plaintiff
must show that a warning would have altered the behavior of
those involved in the incident." '195
The elements of a cause of action in warranty are that the
product was subject to an implied warranty of merchantability,
the product breached the warranty because it was defective, and
the product proximately caused the plaintiff's injury.'9 6 For
negligence, a plaintiff must show that the defendant owed a
duty to the plaintiff, the duty was not performed, and the breach
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury' 97
tion of the component into the design, the defect in the product causes the
harm. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 1, § 5.
193 Jaurequi, 971 F. Supp. at 422. Cf Haddix, 138 F.3d at 683 (applying Illinois
law and stating that the elements of the cause of action are that the product was
in an unreasonably dangerous condition, the condition existed at the time the
product left the manufacturer's control, and that injury resulted from the prod-
uct's condition). Both states' laws track section 402A language closely.
194 SeeJaurequi, 971 F. Supp. at 427 (listing the elements of the cause of action
under Missouri law).
195 Id.
196 See Ruffin v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 149 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 1998) (applying
North Carolina law and stating elements of a warranty cause of action). The
court points out that North Carolina acknowledges no cause of action in strict
liability for products liability cases. See id. at 303. The elements of the cause of
action, at least for warranty in North Carolina, do not focus on the defendant's
conduct, but attend only at the law of implied warranty, the product itself, and
the chain of causation. See id. at 301. Note that in Anderson, Justice Mosk of the
California Supreme Court uses his dissent to distinguish strict liability cases as
those where the focus is on the product. Anderson, 810 P.2d at 562 (citing Kearl v.
Lederle Lab., 172 Cal. App. 3d at 832).
197 SeeJaurequi, 971 F. Supp. at 431.
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B. DEFENSES TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY BY COMPONENTS
MANUFACTURERS.
Defenses to products liability claims include a plaintiffs fail-
ure to allege or prove, or a defendant's rebuttal of, any of the
required elements of a particular claim, as outlined above. In
addition, there are numerous affirmative defenses capable of
defeating products liability suits. These affirmative defenses in-
clude plaintiff's conduct, especially assumption of the risk'98 or
misuse of a product. 99 Further, preemption by government
regulation may usurp a plaintiffs claim, as will a government
contractor defense. 2 ' A seller may also be relieved of liability in
failure to warn cases by the rule of the learned intermediary,
which limits a manufacturer's liability if it warns intermediate
parties, rather than the ultimate consumer. 20' A seller may also
take advantage of the "sophisticated user" rule, which limits the
198 See Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Products Liability: Contributory Negligence or
Assumption of Risk as Defense Under Doctrine of Strict Liability in Tort, 46 A.L.R.3D 240
(1973) ("[c]ontributory negligence in the sense of a failure to discover or guard
against product defects is not a defense to an action based upon strict products
liability in tort, but that assumption of risk does constitute a defense.").
1- See Randy R. Koenders, Annotation, Products Liability: Product Misuse Defense,
65 A.LR.4TH (1988) (stating that evidence of misuse or abnormal use of the
product by someone other than the individual or entity which manufactured or
supplied the product may serve to bar or diminish the recovery of an injured
party or claimant in a products liability action).
200 See Patrick J. Shea, Note, Solving America's General Aviation Crisis: The Advan-
tages of Federal Preemption Over Tort Reform, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 747, 752, 772
(1995) (noting that commercial aviation is regulated by the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958, and arguing that extension of federal regulation could shield general
aviation from tort liability).
201 See Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 725, 730 (E.D. Va. 1998) (ap-
plying Virginia law) (stating that "manufacturers of prescription medical prod-
ucts have a duty only to warn physicians, rather than patients, of the risks
associated with the use of the products"). The Restatement (Third) has a sepa-
rate section dealing exclusively with these areas entitled "Liability of Commercial
Seller or Distributor for Harm Caused by Defective Prescription Drugs and Medi-
cal Devices." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 1,
§ 6 (1998).
While the "learned intermediary" doctrine is mostly applied to manufacturers
of pharmaceuticals, case law is developing in other areas. See generally Davis v.
Cessna Aircraft Corp., 893 P.2d 26, 38 (Ariz. App. 1994) (aviation); Hayes v. Spar-
tan Chem. Co., Inc., 622 So.2d 1352, 1354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (chemicals).
In Hayes, the Florida Court of Appeals observed that warnings to learned in-
termediaries might be preferable in some situations because it would be easier to
establish the adequacy of the warning as read and considered by a trained expert.
622 So. 2d at 1354. Such warnings must be accurate, clear and unambiguous,
and on such an occasion, "the adequacy of a warning is a question of law for the
judge to decide." Id.
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seller's liability to purchasers who are aware of inherent dangers
of products purchased for use in their business.2 °2 A manufac-
turer may also plead an intervening cause as an affirmative de-
fense, which, in products liability cases, usually means a
substantial alteration of the product after it left the manufac-
turer's control.2 °3
C. APPLICATION TO COMPONENTS MANUFACTURERS
A manufacturer of components or avionics may be sued for
any of the causes of action discussed above. If the cause of ac-
202 See Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 462 S.E.2d 321, 331-32 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that a manufacturer has no duty to warn of potential risks or dangers
inherent in a product if the product is distributed to either a learned intermedi-
ary or a sophisticated user). A learned intermediary or a sophisticated user is an
individual who "might be in a position to understand and assess the risks in-
volved, and to inform the ultimate user of the risks, and to, thereby, warn the
ultimate user of any alleged inherent dangers involved in the product." Id. at 331
(jury instruction).
Connecticut courts have applied the sophisticated user rule to hold that a man-
ufacturer will not be liable if the intermediary knew or should have known of the
danger, and knew or should have known of the consequences of failing to take
action. See Gajewski v. Pavelo, 652 A.2d 509, 517 (Conn. Ct. App. 1994). Thus, a
manufacturer is not liable for a failure to warn an intermediary of dangers which
the intermediary already knew. See id. In Gajewski, the Connecticut trial court
defined the sophisticated user as "'the person best able to take precaution
against any potential harm associated with the use of the subject product."' Id. at
516.
The sophisticated user rule has also been applied to sellers of dangerous prod-
ucts in bulk, where the seller must rely on the buyer to warn his employees of
potential dangers. SeeJodway v. Kennametal, Inc., 525 N.W.2d 883, 889 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1994) (absolving the seller of liability to the employees of the buyer).
The court held, as a matter of law, that the seller could have reasonably relied on
the buyer to warn its employees, and applied the rationale that commercial enter-
prises using materials in bulk are regarded as sophisticated users. See id. at 889.
In a different opinion, the Sixth Circuit found that Ohio law did not allow for a
"sophisticated user" or "learned intermediary" defense. See Midwest Specialties,
Inc., v. Crown Indus. Prods. Co., 142 F.3d 435 (6th Cir. 1998).
20 See Blizzard v. Motorola, Inc., No. 94-0207, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4742, *10
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 1995) (quoting Davis v. Berwind Corp., 640 A.2d 1289, 1295
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) for the proposition that a manufacturer "is not liable for
injuries caused by a defective product if the defect was created by a substantial
alteration in the product amounting to a supervening or intervening cause of the
plaintiffs injuries"). Sued by the Philadelphia Police Department, defendant
General Electric Co. claimed that the police had substantially altered a radio re-
transmission facility by changing the correct frequency. See id. at *2 n.1. When
General Electric motioned for summary judgment, the court found it ajury ques-
tion whether a post-delivery modification constitutes substantial change. See id. at
*10-11. The court further found the question may then become whether the
manufacturer could have reasonably foreseen or expected such a change. See id.
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tion is for a manufacturing defect, the truth or falsity of the alle-
gation will be determined at trial.2 °4 The court and the trier of
fact decide whether the product is defective because of a manu-
facturing defect.20 5 In a similar manner, if a design defect is
alleged, the court and the trier of fact determine whether to
apply the consumer expectation test or the risk-utility test.20 6 If
the suit alleges a defect in marketing, the trier of fact may focus
on the product's instructions, directions and warnings to deter-
mine whether a defect existed.20 7
204 See Michael J. Toke, Note: Restatement (Third) of Torts and Design Defectiveness
in American Products Liability Law, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 239, 241 (1996)
[hereinafter Toke] (stating that in cases alleging manufacturing defects, courts
can evaluate the challenged product against the manufacturer's own standards as
manifested by other units in the production line).
205 See PROSSER, supra note 75, § 99, at 695; see also Toke, supra note 204, at 241
n.Il (stating that a product with a manufacturing defect will be readily identifi-
able because it differs from other ostensibly identical units of the same product
line).
206 See PROSSER, supra note 75, § 99, at 698-99; see also Toke, supra note 204, at
246 (stating that a risk-utility balancing test will be the standard for judging defec-
tiveness in product design with the adoption of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts).
207 See Latin, supra note 174, on the various warnings and directions, and how
manufacturers and consumers use and misuse them.
There is no lack of warnings accompanying electrical and electronic compo-
nents. In fact, there are even specializations within the warnings. For example,
there are limits to which the parts have been tested and disclaimers as to product
performance, including actual performance violations of manufacturer's and
third party intellectual property rights (patents), and even trademark and
copyrights:
PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Performance tests and ratings are
measured using specific computer systems and/or components and
reflect the approximate performance of Intel products as measured
by those tests. Any difference in system hardware or software design
or configuration may affect actual performance. Buyers should con-
sult other sources of information to evaluate the performance of
systems or components they are considering purchasing. For more
information on performance tests and on the performance of Intel
products, visit http://www.intel.com/procs/perf/limits.htm or call
(U.S.) 1-800-628-8686 or 1-916-356-3104.
Intel Corporation, Legal Notices (visited Aug. 17, 1998) <http://www.intel.com/
sites/corporate/tradmarx.htm>.
The disclaimer on the same site is very explicit, going further to state that all
materials are provided "as is," and specifically disclaiming any warranty of
merchantability for a specific purpose.
DISCLAIMER: THE MATERIALS ARE PROVIDED "AS IS" WITH-
OUT ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTY OF ANY KIND IN-
CLUDING WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
NONINFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, OR FIT-
NESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT SHALL
1999] PRODUCTS LIABILITY 1237
1. Defenses to Component Defects
A supplier's first lines of defense may be that the supplier did
not make the product,20 8 the transaction involved a service
rather than a part,20 9 the product was not defective, 2 10 the prod-
INTEL OR ITS SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER (INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, DAM-
AGES FOR LOSS OF PROFITS, BUSINESS INTERRUPTION,
LOSS OF INFORMATION) ARISING OUT OF THE USE OF OR
INABILITY TO USE THE MATERIALS, EVEN IF INTEL HAS
BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. BE-
CAUSE SOME JURISDICTIONS PROHIBIT THE EXCLUSION
OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENTIAL OR IN-
CIDENTAL DAMAGES, THE ABOVE LIMITATION MAY NOT AP-
PLY TO YOU. Intel and its suppliers further do not warrant the
accuracy or completeness of the information, text, graphics, links
or other items contained within these materials. Intel may make
changes to these materials, or to the products described therein, at
any time without notice. Intel makes no commitment to update the
Materials.
Id. (emphases in the original).
208 See Clements v. Boeing, Weber Aircraft, Inc., No. Civ. A. 92-3034, 1993 WL
45086, *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 1993) (stating that Boeing did not manufacture,
supply or sell the aircraft seat which caused injury to a stewardess). Summary
judgment was granted in favor of Boeing, and it was found that the airline opera-
tor had procured the seats independently. See id. at *2.
Jurisdiction may also be challenged, as was exhibited in Roethlisberger v. To-
kyo Aircraft Instrument Co. (TKK) of Japan, No. 90-CV-885, 1991 WL 347671, at
*1 (W.D. Mich. May 8, 1991). Beech Aircraft Corp. (Beech), one of the named
defendants, claimed that the court lacked personal jurisdiction because the com-
pany had insufficient "minimum contacts" with the state of Michigan. See id.
Beech maintained no office in Michigan, made no deliveries to Michigan, paid
no taxes in Michigan, and did not sell the plane at issue to a Michigan purchaser.
See id. Nevertheless, the court found "continuous and systematic" business con-
tacts by Beech through its independent dealer in Michigan, visits by Beech repre-
sentatives to the dealer in Michigan, a million-dollar inventory at the dealer in
Michigan, and the use of the Beech trademark and trade name within Michigan.
See id. at *2.
2 0 In one case, a defendant claimed to have furnished only services, not the
product. See Dudley v. Business Express, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 199, 210 (D.N.H.
1994) (stating a successful defense to products liability exists when the defend-
ants furnished transportation services, not products such as aircraft, to
customers).
210 See Momen v. United States, 946 F. Supp. 196, 207 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating
that a plaintiff in a products liability case must demonstrate, at a minimum, that
the product was dangerous). See also Veale v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 899 S.W.2d
239, 239-245 (Tex. App-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ) (holding a connect-
ing rod not defective in the crash of a Cessna aircraft which resulted in the pilot's
death).
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uct did not proximately cause the injury,211 or no compensable
injury exists.212 Along with the "economic loss" doctrine, these
defenses are available to components manufacturers, or those
who assemble components into circuit boards or higher assem-
blies, since all those involved are either manufacturers or assem-
blers. Other defenses, as outlined in Section B above, will also
be explored.
Possible defects in the manufacturing of electronic parts are
legion.213 However, manufacturers of electronic components go
to great lengths to insure the reliability of their parts, not merely
for aviation, but for industrial, automotive, and general and con-
sumer use as well. 214 In fact, few cases in the products-liability
literature focus on electronic or electrical defects involving sub-
stantial amounts of misuse,21 5 assumption of risk,216 or negli-
211 See id. (explaining that defendant successfully moved for summary judg-
ment on the grounds that the defect could not have resulted in injury to the
plaintiff). See also Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp. v. Universal Health Servs., Inc.,
778 S.W.2d 492, 496-99 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ) (observing that pilot
error and subsequent conduct caused the helicopter to crash, not a product
defect).
212 Purely economic losses are not recoverable under tort theories in the ab-
sence of personal injury or damage to property other than the product itself,
even in the case of a helicopter crash. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pitts-
burgh, Pa. v. Pratt and Whitney Canada, Inc., 815 P.2d 601 (Nev. 1991); Midwest
Helicopter Airways, Inc. v. Sikorsky Aircraft, Div. of United Techs. Corp., 849 F.
Supp. 666 (E.D. Wis. 1994); see also Gui Zhi v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., No.
Civ. A. 4:47-CV-407-Y, 1997 WL 786494, at *1, *2-3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 1997)
(stating that "Texas law does not recognize a negligence ... claim for purely
economic loss .... [and that] strict liability claims do not extend to losses result-
ing from damage to the product itself because that is essentially a loss to the
purchaser of the benefit of the bargain").
213 See, e.g., PECHT, supra note 5, at 235-237 (listing defects, failure mechanisms,
failures, and their causes).
214 See id., at 325-60 (stating that the manufacturer usually qualifies products,
and that those products should be qualified by the customer for specialized appli-
cations). "Qualification is the validation of a product's capability to function in
its intended application." Id. at 325. Qualification may consist of many steps,
including: goal-setting, determination of environmental and operational stresses,
identification of failure mechanisms and modes, the conducting of tests and col-
lection of failure rate data to assess reliability and durability of the products, and
the interpretation of data and reports. See id. at 326.
215 See Erickson v. Monarch Indus., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 99 (Neb. 1984).
216 See Gibson v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 878 F. Supp. 1455, 1462 (N.D. Ala.
1994) ("[D]ecedent knew that the warning signals often sounded and flashed in
the absence of an approaching train ... [but] the decedent still assumed the risk
of collision by crossing those tracks without taking the necessary precau-
tions .... "). In Alabama, assumption of risk acts as an affirmative defense, and is
a complete defense to a claim brought under the Alabama Extended Manufac-
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gence involving uses that go well beyond those which the
manufacturer reasonably calculated.217
2. Product Not Defective
The most defensible position for components manufacturers
in a products liability suit is to make a product that is not defec-
tive.218 That was the defense assumed by Siemens, a company
that supplied airbag components for use in General Motors cars.
Sipes, the plaintiff, owned a General Motors car whose airbag
did not deploy in a collision, causing serious injuries. 219 The
collision was one involving a side-impact, and the airbag system
was only designed for a frontal or near-frontal collision.22 ° It was
undisputed that the airbag was designed for deployment only in
a frontal or near-frontal collision.221
Siemens, supplier of a sensor used in the airbag, was granted
partial summary judgment on allegations of a design defect on
the grounds that it did not design the airbag system, but merely
supplied parts for the airbag system.222 Siemens was also
granted summary judgment on the issue of failure to warn, since
the sensors were "not conspicuous to the user of the automo-
bile. '22 3 The court agreed that if Siemens' products conformed
to its specifications there was no manufacturing defect.
224
turer's Liability doctrine. See id. The defense is complete if the defendant can
prove that the injured knew and appreciated the danger of the situation, and
voluntarily consented to bear the risk. See id. The law is substantially the same in
Illinois, where assumption of risk is an affirmative defense in a products liability
case, and consists of the defendant's subjectively showing that the injured individ-
ual proceeded in his actions despite knowledge, understanding and appreciation
of the danger. See Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 261 N.E.2d 305, 312 (Ill. 1970).
217 See Woodling, 813 F.2d at 548 (stating that the aircraft operator was seventy
percent liable for negligence).
218 See Sipes v. General Motors Corp., 946 S.W.2d 143, 159 (Tex. App. - Texar-
kana 1997, no writ) ("A component manufacturer who did not design a system
and whose finished product conforms to the manufacturer's design standard is
not liable for a fabricated defect."). This holding is completely in agreement
with the spirit of the Restatement (Third) of Torts.
219 See id. at 146.
220 See id. at 147.
221 See id. at 148.
222 See id. at 159.
223 Id. at 157.
224 See Sipes, 946 S.W.2d at 159. The court did not accept Siemens' testimony as
to the quality of the sensors at issue because their expert had not examined
them. See id. at 160. That issue was remanded to the trial court. See id. at 161-62.
The appellate court also held firm in refusing to grant the joint appellant-defend-
ants' motions for summary judgment on the issues of design defect, implied or
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3. Product Misuse
Manufacturers may escape liability if they can show that prod-
uct misuse was the cause of the plaintiffs injury. An interesting
example dealing with misuse of electrical components is Erickson
v. Monarch Indus., Inc.22 5 In Erickson, a grain-drying facility hired
a contractor to install grain-drying equipment.226 Later, an elec-
trical transformer failed, causing an explosion which killed an
operator. 27 The deceased's estate sued the general contractor,
the electrical contractor, and Square D Company and one of its
subsidiaries, the manufacturer of the transformer. 228 The plain-
tiff alleged that Square D was negligent in supplying a defective
transformer, failing to test the transformer, and failing to give
proper warnings.2 29 The trial court returned a verdict against
the contractors who had miswired the transformer, but found
no liability on the part of Square D.230
The transformer was designed to be wired in several different
ways. 23 1 But, because the manufacturer's instructions were in-
cluded with the transformer, and it was supplied to those who
would have special knowledge as to how to install the trans-
former, the court concluded that the supplier had no additional
duty to warn. 2  In affirming the lower court's decision, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court held it was only because of improper wir-
ing and installation that the transformer could cause any
hazard. 3  The court also noted that Square D had supplied a
express warranty, negligence, or failure to warn. See id. at 156-59. The court held
that only Siemens was entitled to partial summary judgment on the issues of
warnings and design. See id. at 157, 159.
225 347 N.W.2d at 99.





231 See Erickson, 347 N.W.2d at 104. The manner in which the defendant elec-
trical contractor wired the transformer caused a 50-percent overload on the
transformer, that resulted in overheating, the introduction of flammable gases
into the electrical cabinet, and an explosion from an electrical arc when the main
disconnect switch was thrown. See id. at 104-05.
232 See id. at 109. In a variation of the "sophisticated user" defense, the court
held that it "was not reasonably foreseeable that a consumer of particular exper-
tise would fail to follow directions." Id. (citing Hughes v. Magic Chef, 288
N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1980)).
233 See id. The court cited other jurisdictions on this point. "A manufacturer
or supplier is not required to warn about every conceivable danger that might
arise from a misuse of the product." Id. at 109 (citing Westerberg v. School Dist.
No. 792, 148 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 1967)). "Failure to follow plain and unam-
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transformer with instructions and directions, and that if the
transformer had been installed, wired and fused in accordance
with those instructions and directions, "there would not have
been an accident."2 34
Erickson dealt with user misuse, in a manner very similar to
that encountered in the first case discussed in this Comment,
Woodling v. Garrett Corp.235 The electricians in Erickson miswired
a transformer, thus causing the operator's death.3 6 In much
the same way, it appears the miswiring of the Texasgulf aircraft
electrical system in Garrett was the cause of the generator trip-
pings, and ultimately, the crash of the aircraft.237
biguous instructions is a misuse of the product." Id. (citing Proctor & Gamble
Mfg. Co. v. Langley, on reh'g, 422 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)).
234 Erickson, 347 N.W.2d at 109.
235 813 F.2d at 543.
236 347 N.W.2d at 104.
237 See Texasgulf, Inc., 615 F. Supp. at 652-53.
While Garrett and Erickson are good examples of misuse, the defense is not al-
ways honored. In Philadelphia, a fire-house boiler exploded, killing one
firefighter and severely injuring two others. See Dougherty v. EdwardJ. Meloney,
Inc., 661 A.2d 375, 378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). This products liability suit joined
numerous defendants, including the gas supplier (Philadelphia Gas Works), the
fire station architect, the heating system installer, the boiler manufacturer, the
controller manufacturer, and the manufacturer of the automatic gas safety shut-
off valve, which should have prevented the explosion. See id. at 378-80.
There was evidence that the firefighters knew that the boiler's valve did not
work, that it was missing parts, and that it had to be unscrewed and tapped on in
order to operate. See id. at 379. Further, the valve was known to stick on occa-
sion. See id. Two weeks before the explosion, the valve became stuck in the open
position twice, causing the boiler to overheat. See id. A serviceman from Phila-
delphia Gas Works fixed the valve once by bending it with pliers. See id. The
second time, however, the serviceman informed the fire station captain that the
valve needed to be replaced, but neglected to mention that the boiler could not
be operated safely. See Dougherty, 661 A.2d at 379. The cost of replacing the valve
was approximately $300. See id.
The trial court found the valve manufacturer liable for approximately $8 mil-
lion, and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed. See id. at 380, 388. The
court held "it was unforeseeable that the valve cap would be removed and the
armature would be tapped when the valve was stuck." Id. at 386. In other words,
the court did not find that the failure of the Philadelphia Gas Works to replace
the valve was a superseding and intervening cause because the negligent acts
must be "so extraordinary as not to have been reasonably foreseeable." Id. at 387
(quoting Powell v. Drumheller, 653 A.2d 619, 623 (Penn. 1995)). A possible ex-
planation for the court not holding Philadelphia Gas Works liable may be that
the city owned the utility. See Andrew Maykuth, Heat is on Gas Works, PHILADEL-
PHIA INQUIRER, Feb. 18, 1996, at 1 (stating that Philadelphia Gas Works is a mu-
nicipal utility, and thus city-owned).
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4. Comparative Negligence or Assumption of Risk
Contributory negligence has been rejected as a defense to
products liability claims in favor of comparative negligence, or
assumption of risk. In California, a drunk-driving case showed
how the user's negligence can be a defense to product de-
fects.238 In Daly, an attorney crashed his car into a metal divider
fence on a Los Angeles freeway. 2 9 The force of the impact
threw open the car door and ejected the driver, resulting in fatal
head injuries.240 Neither party disputed that the injuries would
have been minor had he remained in the car.241 His estate sued
under a strict liability theory for a defectively designed door
latch on the grounds that the latch should not have come open
during the crash, and that, but for the latch, the decedent would
not have died. 42
The defendant pointed out that the deceased was intoxicated,
that the car was equipped with both a seat belt-shoulder harness
system and a door lock, and that the operator's manual con-
tained warnings that the seat belts should be worn with the
doors locked while the car is in motion. The deceased used
neither the harness system nor the door lock.243 The jury re-
turned a verdict for the defendants, and the California Supreme
Court affirmed, applying the principles of comparative negli-
gence in strict liability actions.244 The effect was positive, in that
comparative negligence does not completely bar a plaintiff's
claim, while contributory negligence in a products liability case
bars recovery. 245
238 Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978).




243 See id. at 1165.
244 See Daly, 575 P.2d at 1175.
245 See id. at 1169. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Mosk takes umbrage at the
change the majority is invoking in the present case calling the decision a "dark
day" for the court. Id. at 1185. Justice Mosk continues to believe, as he did in
Greenman, that the tort of negligence is a "foreign object" in that of products
liability. See Daly, 575 P.2d at 1181. Moreover, he asserts one assumes the risk if
one chooses to use a product that is patently defective when there are other alter-
natives available, or if one chooses to use a product in a manner in which it was
clearly not intended to be used. See id. at 1185. That is, "[o]ne who employs a
power saw to trim his fingernails-and thereafter finds the number of his fingers
reduced-should not prevail to any extent whatever against the manufacturer
even if the saw had a defective blade." Id. at 1185. Hence, Justice Mosk argues
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Contributory negligence, which consists of voluntarily and un-
reasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and is
often referred to as assumption of risk, is a defense under sec-
tion 402A; but contributory negligence, which consists of a mere
failure to discover the defect, or guard against its existence, is
not a defense.246 Under section 402A, then, contributory princi-
ples apply, in that if the user or consumer discovers the defect
and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the
product and is injured by it, the user is barred from recovery. 47
Comparative negligence provides a better measure of fairness in
products liability cases.248
As for electronic components, a component manufacturer
will likely argue that a user assumed the risk of product failure
by using a component beyond the temperature ranges specified
by the manufacturer.
5. Preemption
A preemption defense normally calls for the application of
federal over state law,249 and there are also cases in which the
law of contracts preempts tort law.250 The principal law available
assumption of the risk should remain a "total defense to products liability, as it
always has been." Id. at 1186.
246 See § 402A, supra note 13, cmt. n.
247 See id.
248 See Daly, 575 P.2d at 1175 (stating that by extending and tailoring the prin-
ciples of comparative negligence to the doctrine of strict liability, we move closer
to the goal of equitable allocation of legal responsibility for personal injuries).
249 SeeJOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARZ'S CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON TORTS, CH. XV, at 791 (9th ed. 1994) ("State law is preempted by federal
law, and as a practical matter, the manufacturer need comply only with the fed-
eral statute and the regulations issued under it."). State law is preempted when
the federal government, under the supremacy clause, has a unique interest and
must complete government work. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500,
505 (1988). In Boyle, the Court stated that federal control may be justified by the
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and even "federal common law" (fed-
eral law of a content prescribed by the courts) to replace and preempt state law.
Id. at 504.
250 See Larry D. Scheafer, Annotation, Pre-Emption of Strict Liability in Tort by Pro-
visions of UCC Article 2, 15 A.L.R.4TH 791 (1982 and Supp. 1998). The annotation
collects cases in which courts have at least discussed whether Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) preempts the doctrine of strict liability in tort
for products liability cases. See id. The author notes that the doctrine of strict
liability in tort developed about the same time as the law relating to the sales
provisions of the UCC. See id. at 792. The best argument for separate liability
may be that strict liability has its foundation in tort, rather than in contract, and
therefore, the UCC does not preclude tort actions. See id. Proponents of pre-
emption argue that strict liability in tort acts to undermine remedies provied to
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to aviation products liability suits is the General Aviation Revital-
ization Act (GARA) of 1994.251 Both the preemption defense
and GARA applied in the case of a helicopter crash involving
two fatalities which were caused by an allegedly defective engine
compressor vane.252 The engine was delivered in August 1975
and the crash took place in November 1993, after the eighteen-
year period prescribed by GARA.253 The court held that GARA
applied, and barred the plaintiffs suits against the helicopter
and engine manufacturers. 54
The plaintiffs attempted to extend the liability period by
claiming that periodic bulletins and manuals issued by the man-
ufacturers extended the period under GARA.255 The court re-
viewed case law and state preemption statutes throughout the
country and concluded that the publications did not extend
customers under the Code, and, further, that the clear intent of the Code was to
remedy consumer injury through sales warranty law. See id. at 792-93. Of course,
if a case involves economic injury, rather than personal injury, the remedy may
be limited to a breach of warranty action for direct and consequential economic
losses only. See id. at 184 (Supp. 1998) (citing Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660 (NJ. 1985)).
251 48 U.S.C.A. § 40101 et. seq. (1994) Federal law supersedes any state law to
the extent that such law permits a civil action to be brought after an eighteen-
year period:
No civil action for damages for death or injury to persons or dam-
age to property arising out of an accident involving a general avia-
tion aircraft may be brought against the manufacturer of the
aircraft or the manufacturer of any new component, system, subas-
sembly, or other part of the aircraft, in its capacity as a manufac-
turer if the accident occurred-
(1) after the applicable limitation period (18 years] beginning
on-
(A) the date of delivery of the aircraft to its first purchaser or
lessee, if delivered directly from the manufacturer; or
(B) the date of first delivery of the aircraft to a person en-
gaged in the business of selling or leasing such aircraft; or
(2) with respect to any new component, system, subassembly, or
other part which replaced another component, system, subas-
sembly, or other part originally in, or which was added to, the
aircraft, and which is alleged to have caused such death, injury,
or damage, after the applicable limitation period beginning on
the date of completion of the replacement or addition.
Id. (quoting GARA's historical and statutory notes).
252 See Alter v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 531, 533 (S.D. Tex.
1996).
253 See id. at 533, 536.
254 See id. at 542.
255 See id. at 537.
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GARA. 256 "GARA clearly prohibits a lawsuit arising from design
or manufacturing defects in an aircraft delivered more than
eighteen years before the accident."2 7 The court reasoned that
a failure to warn or an incorrect statement in a manual is also
barred after the eighteen-year period because such a suit would
be a "back door to sue for the design [or manufacturing]
flaw. ' 258 The court found plaintiff's argument inconsistent with
the spirit and intent of GARA, and granted summary judgment
for the defendants. 25 9
Perhaps the most subtle preemption defense is one like that
was brought by the defendants in Gregoiy v. Garrett,26" a case re-
lated to Woodling v. Garrett.261 In Gregory, the workman's com-
pensation issue turned on which entity employed the eight
deceased individuals, and, thus, which state's law applied.262
The court considered whether ostensible employees of Texas-
gulf Aviation were actually employees of Texasgulf, Inc., the
100% shareholder of Texasgulf Aviation.2 63 Of the eight people
killed, four were residents of Connecticut who worked in Con-
necticut, while two were residents of Connecticut who worked in
New York. The remaining two were residents of North Carolina
who worked in North Carolina.264 Under both North Carolina
and Connecticut workman's compensation laws, Texasgulf, Inc.
was immune from direct liability.265
In addition to being defenses against direct liability, Connecti-
cut and North Carolina workman's compensation laws discour-
age third-party impleading actions. 266 The plaintiffs, therefore,
had to be creative in their suits. They wanted New York law to
apply because they preferred New York's pro-third-party ap-
256 See id. at 538-40, 541.
257 Id. at 541.
258 Alter, 944 F. Supp. at 53940 (citing Butchkosky v. Enstrom Helicopter Co.,
855 F. Supp. 1251, 1257 (S.D. Fla. 1993)).
259 See id. at 542.
260 578 F. Supp. at 871.
261 813 F.2d at 543.
262 578 F. Supp. at 879-80.
263 See id. at 876.
264 See id. at 875. The flight began in New York, went to Toronto, Ontario,
Canada, and returned to New York, the site of the crash. See id. at 875.
265 See id. at 876 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-284 (a) (1972), and N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 91-10.1 (1979)).
266 See id. at 879. In such an action, the plaintiffs could sue other defendants
such as Garrett Corp., who would then implead Texasgulf, Inc. or TexasgulfAvia-
tion, or both. Thus the plaintiffs could achieve indirectly what they could not
directly accomplish. See id.
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proach.267 The district court analyzed the conflict of laws issue
and decided that New York law applied because the crashed oc-
curred in New York.268
The preemption defense also applies when there is a federal
law that prohibits the states from enacting statutes relating to a
particular good. Thus preemption applies in the case of medi-
cal devices,269 insecticides,2 70 and automobiles.271 One example
is tampon products liability covered by the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976 to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
2 7 See Gregory, 578 F. Supp. at 879.
2- See id. at 881. The "most significant contacts" factors considered in an ac-
tion for a tort (negligence) include the state in which the injury occurred, the
state in which the conduct causing or injury occurred, the domicile or place of
business of each party, and the state in which the relationship between the parties
is centered. See id. at 881 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 145 (b)(2) (1971)).
2 9 See Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, as amended by the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or
political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect
with respect to a device intended for human use any require-
ment-
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement ap-
plicable under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to
any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the
device under this chapter.
21 U.S.C.A. § 360k(a) (1994).
270 See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, Rodenticide Act:
(a) A State may regulate the sale or use of any federally registered
pesticide or device in the State, but only if and to the extent the
regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited by this sub-
chapter. (b) Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any
requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different
from those required under this subchapter.
7 U.S.C.A. § 136v(a)-(b) (1994).
271 See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Authorization Act:
When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chap-
ter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or
continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of per-
formance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if
the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this
chapter. However, the United States government, a State, or a
political subdivision of a State may prescribe a standard for a motor
vehicle or motor vehicle equipment obtained for its own use that
imposes a higher performance requirement than that required by
the otherwise applicable standard under this chapter.
15 U.S.C. § 30103 (b) (1) (1994).
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Act.272 For instance, the Act mandates that particular warnings
be placed on each box of tampons, and if the plaintiff reads the
warnings and is aware of a risk, the Act preempts any state law
claim of failure to warn. 273 In addition, the Act preempts any
state law claim regarding a failure under the "consumer contem-
plation" test.274 Some federal statutes, however, as is the case
with environmental laws, do enable suits rather than preempt
them.2 7
5
While there may not be a specific preemption defense avail-
able to the manufacturer of electronic components, a variety of
such defenses are applicable as shown in the following section,
and diligent products liability advocates should familiarize
themselves with these possibilities.
6. Government Contractor Defense
The government contractor defense is a special type of pre-
emption or immunity defense wherein the contractor may claim
that government requirements preclude liability in civil court,
272 See Haddix, 138 F.3d at 683.
273 See id.
274 See id. at 686. A product fails the consumer contemplation test when it is
"dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordi-
nary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the
community as to its characteristics." Id. (quoting Hunt v. Blasius, 384 N.E.2d 368,
372 (Ill. 1978), reh'g denied) (1979)).
275 Citizen suits are specifically allowed under provisions of the Consumer
Product Safety Act. Section 2072(a) states the following:
Any person who shall sustain injury by reason of any knowing (in-
cluding willful) violation of a consumer product safety rule, or any
other rule or order issued by the Commission may sue any person
who knowingly (including willfully) violated any such rule or order
in any district court of the United States ....
15 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1994).
Section 2073 states: " [a] ny interested person (including any individual or non-
profit, business, or other entity) may bring an action in any United States district
court . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 2073 (1994).
Section 2074(a) states that "[C]ompliance with consumer product safety rules
or other rules or orders under this chapter shall not relieve any person from
liability at common law or under State statutory law to any other person." 15
U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1994).
Citizen suits are also authorized under federal environmental laws including
the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-92, § 2619 (1994); the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387, § 1365 (1994); the
Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92k, § 6972 (1994); the Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q, § 7604 (1994); and the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75,
§ 9659 (1994).
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especially in matters relating to safety. 276 In Boyle, a Marine
Corps pilot drowned when his helicopter crashed during a train-
ing exercise.277 He could not escape from the craft because the
escape hatch opened outward and was useless under water.2 78
His father sued, alleging defective design of the escape system
and defective repair of the servo, a device in the automatic flight
control system that caused the crash.279 Sikorsky, the helicopter
manufacturer, claimed immunity from tortious liability under
the government contractor defense. °
The Court held that it was in the government's interest to
carve out federal preemption of state law to complete govern-
ment work, whether through federal officials or government
contractors.2 1 The grounds for preemption under this defense
must be that unique federal interest exists where the application
of state law frustrates the specific objectives of federal policy.2 2
That interest may extend to limit the liability of federal officials
for acting in the course of their duties and even, as in Boyle, to
limit the liability to third persons in tort arising from perform-
ing a government contract.2 3 The preemption may be author-
ized by the U.S. Constitution, the laws of the United States, or
through federal law prescribed by the courts without explicit
statutory authority-the "federal common law. '284 The Court
found a significant conflict between Virginia state law and the
needs of the federal government in this situation, and that a
state law presenting a significant conflict with federal policy
must be displaced.28 5
The Court did not want to limit liability for every stock item
that the government ordered but wanted to limit this defense to
situations when officials exercised discretion in ordering mili-
tary equipment. 28 6 To that end, the Court held that liability for
276 See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511 (stating that "the selection of the appropriate de-
sign for military equipment to be used by [the] Armed forces" involves balancing
and tradeoffs, especially between military effectiveness and safety).
277 Id. at 502.
278 See id.
279 See id. at 503.
280 See id.
281 See id. at 504-05.
282 See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507. The fact that the area in question is one of
unique federal concern changes what would otherwise be a conflict that cannot
produce preemption into one that can. Id. at 508.
283 Id. at 505.
284 Id. at 504.
285 See id. at 511-12.
286 See id. at 509-11.
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design defects in military equipment could not be imposed pur-
suant to state law "when (1) the United States approved reason-
ably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to
those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United
States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were
known to the supplier but not to the United States." 287
As applied to electronic parts, or "uprated" electronic parts,
the government contractor immunity defense is available if the
parts are furnished under a military specification. 288 For the de-
fense to apply, the government must do more than "rubber
stamp" the designs, 28 and the required warnings must be com-
municated to the government in a reasonably effective man-
ner.29° A contractor will not be liable if it communicates
everything it knows, 291 but there is no duty to warn of open and
obvious dangers. 92 In sum, a successful defense includes both
an approved design and a warning to the government. 29
7. Learned Intermediary Defense
A manufacturer may assert the "learned intermediary" de-
fense on the grounds that the product and the warning are sup-
plied to a specialized class of people who may prescribe or
administer the product.294 Although the defense is usually ap-
plied in medical products cases, it has been successfully raised in
the aircraft industry, as exemplified by a suit against Cessna and
the firm supplying its aircraft's engine. 295 A Cessna airplane
287 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
288 See id, (stating that the defense applied if the government furnished reason-
ably precise specifications.)
289 See Tate v. Boeing Helicopters, 140 F.3d 654, 657 (6th Cir. 1998).
29o See id. at 660.
-1 See Emory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 148 F.3d 347, 353 (4th Cir. 1998)
(applying Maryland law).
22 See id. at 352.
-3 See Butler v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 89 F.3d 582, 586. (9th Cir. 1996)
(applying California law) (stating that the government contractor's defense may
be used to trump a design defect claim by proving that the government, not the
contractor, is responsible for the defective design; but defendants in a "failure to
warn" claim must show that they were acting in compliance with "reasonably pre-
cise specifications" imposed by the United States).
294 See Davis, 893 P.2d at 38.
295 See id. at 29. The Restatement (Third) of Torts addresses the liability of a
commercial seller or distributor for harm caused by defective prescription drugs
and medical devices. The portion which relates to foreseeable harm of a drug or
medical device states that a drug or device is not reasonably safe if the risk of
harm is sufficiently great, relative to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits, that
knowledgeable health care providers would not prescribe the drug or medical
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crashed when a defect in the fuel system caused the engine to
fail.2 6 The plaintiffs claimed that the engine did not have a
proper line for venting vapor, causing vapor lock and flooding
the engine. 291
In response to plaintiff's claims, the engine maker adopted
the learned intermediary defense, claiming that Cessna knew
what would happen if the aircraft were refueled at a sufficiently
high pressure. As evidence of Cessna's awareness of this danger,
the engine maker cited its warning to Cessna about the potential
danger of refueling at high pressures.298 Cessna also demon-
strated awareness of the potential dangers of high-pressure fuel
by installing a microswitch to prevent the auxiliary pump from
pumping fuel at too high a pressure. 29 Based on this evidence,
the court granted summary judgment in favor of the engine
manufacturer. 00
As applied to electronics components, no one seriously argues
that makers of diodes and transistors should be liable for their
applications in aircraft computers or navigation equipment un-
device for any class of patients. See RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY, supra note 1, § 6(c).
296 See Davis, 893 P.2d at 30. An auxiliary fuel boost pump was able to exceed
the engine's prescribed fuel inlet pressures which could have led to flooding of
the engine. See id. at 38.
297 See id. at 37-38 (stating that the engine manufacturer should have foreseen
that the aircraft manufacturer might add such a pump and should have warned
against it).
298 See id. at 38.
299 See id.
300 See id. at 39. Arizona honored the learned intermediary defense in Davis.
However, since the doctrine is so firmly rooted in medical and pharmaceutical
products, other courts have declined to extend the doctrine beyond those prod-
ucts. For instance, a maker of hydraulic valves was denied the defense under
Massachusetts law. See Officer v. Teledyne Republic/Sprague, 870 F. Supp. 408,
410 (D. Mass. 1994) (stating that the learned intermediary rule presupposes the
predictable existence of such an intermediary, and noting that the defendant
manufacturer's products were widespread, with the particular intermediary in
this case being "a complete fortuity").
Texas also refuses to extend the learned intermediary rule to products other
than prescription drugs. See Khan v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 711 S.W.2d 310, 313
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1986). In Khan, the defendant Velsicol supplied dangerous
chemicals to a maker of termiticide, Miss Phoebe's Pest Control, Inc., whose cus-
tomer was injured by a product made with Velsicol's products. Id. at 312. The
court recognized that the supplier of a bulk chemical had no practicable method
of warning the consumer or giving it instructions concerning the safe use of the
product. See id. at 314. For these reasons, the court found Velsicol could only
escape liability to the consumer if it gave adequate warning or instructions to
Miss Phoebe's. See id.
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less the component manufacturer substantially participated in
the design and application to that equipment. Nevertheless, the
makers of avionics and similar equipment are learned in-
termediaries, and can be held liable as such.
8. Sophisticated User Defense
The "sophisticated user" defense limits a seller's liability to
employers who are aware of the inherent dangers of products
purchased for use in the employer's business.3 °0 As applied to
components, a component manufacturer has no duty to warn
(and no liability) if the user or installer knew or should have
known of a dangerous condition and of the consequences of
failing to correct the condition. 0 2 The buyer's use of the prod-
uct may have sufficiently transformed the product into some-
thing beyond what the seller furnished, 3  and such
modification may arguably have changed the product suffi-
ciently to make the seller not liable for defects that did not exist
when the product left its possession. 4
In Gajewski, a homeowner suffered permanent injury from
carbon monoxide poisoning caused by improper ventilation in
the furnace flue. 05 The court found no duty on the part of the
furnace manufacturer to warn the homeowner, reasoning that
the installer was best able to prevent harm associated with the
use of the product. 0 6 Applying the sophisticated user doctrine,
the court also found no manufacturer duty to warn the installer
301 See Bragg, 462 S.E.2d at 331-32.
302 See Gajewski v. Pavelo, 652 A.2d 509, 517 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994).
303 See Torres v. Xomox Corp., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 455, 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
304 See id. (citing Daly, 575 P.2d at 1162 and Moerer v. Ford Motor Co., 129 Cal.
Rptr. 112 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)). Note that section 402A of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts limits liability to instances where the product "is expected to and
does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold." § 402A(1) (b), supra note 13. Comment q to section 402A states
that manufacturer liability for component parts assembled into a product termi-
nates when that component is incorporated, especially where there is no change
to the part itself.
Such a defense was precluded in the case of a shotgun which discharged acci-
dentally, injuring a hunter. See Klonowski v. International Armament Corp., 17
F.3d 992, 993 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Wisconsin law). The shotgun fired be-
cause a component was defective, allowing the gun to fire even with the safety on.
See id. at 994. The court held that the defendant was not entitled to the "substan-
tial change" defense because the product was defective and unreasonably danger-
ous when it left the manufacturer's control. See id. at 997.
305 Gajewski, 652 A.2d at 511.
306 See id. at 516 (echoing a learned intermediary defense).
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if the installer or his employees already knew of the danger and
the consequences." 7
An allegedly defective valve in a chemical line in Torres caused
two workers to be doused with sulfuric acid sludge, killing one
and severely burning the other."° At issue were the design of
the valve and the furnishing of a replacement part for the
valve." 9 Among other defenses, Xomox claimed that it would
have been impossible for it to communicate directly with the
thousands of valve users, and that additional warnings were not
required because its users were sophisticated. 310 The trial jury
did not accept this argument because there was no evidence of
written warnings concerning the use of the valves and possible
dangers with the valves. 1
The sophisticated user defense also applies to electronic com-
ponents. Such components are not normally dangerous to their
users (assemblers and installers) but may become dangerous if
used inappropriately. A component manufacturer can best pre-
serve this defense by furnishing nondefective products and ex-
plicitly noting the temperature or other environmental
conditions which are necessary for successful operation of its
components.
9. Intervening Causes
The intervening cause defense commonly alleges that a part
was substantially altered after the product left the manufac-
turer's control. 12 In Torres, one of the issues was whether the
admitted modification was sufficient to constitute a concurrent
or superseding cause of the injury. 13 The record did not indi-
307 See id. at 517 Under Connecticut law, the "sophisticated user" is not so
much an affirmative defense as an element of the case to be weighed in the ag-
gregate by the trier of fact. See id.
308 Torres, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 459.
309 See id. at 461.
310 See id. at 468.
511 See id.
312 See Blizzard, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *10. While an intervening cause does
not absolve a defendant's actions, courts will recognize a limit to a defendant's
liability when causes of independent origin bring about the harm to which the
defendant's conduct has substantially contributed. See PROSSER, supra note 75, at
301. Prosser defines an intervening cause as one that comes into active operation
in producing the result after the defendant's negligence. See id.
313 Torres, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 465 (arguing that there was no liability for a de-




cate that there was a modification sufficient to be the sole cause
of the accident.3 14
One court has held that the alteration of a molding machine,
allowing a worker access to pinch points, was an intervening
cause. 15 However, another court found no superseding cause
in the case of an informal drawing to which strict conformity was
not required. 6 In Pasquale, only an informal, unsophisticated
drawing was used for the housing of a clutch mechanism on a
racing car; when the clutch burst, the housing did not contain
the exploding parts, killing a racing spectator.317
There was no substantial alteration of the product in the case
of the Lockheed Jetstar crash.318 In Woodling, the defendant
GCU manufacturer and installer argued that the conduct of the
plane operators was a supervening cause sufficient to relieve it
of its liability in the airplane crash and the death of eight
men.3 19 The court cited recent New York law holding that reck-
less, intentional, and even criminal intervening acts are not su-
perseding causes when they are foreseeable.3 20 The court stated
that neither Garrett nor Phoenix gave any warnings or provided
any protections that the deceased ignored or refused to
follow.3 21
Almost every electronic component will be used in an assem-
bly of some kind, whether a circuit board, a higher assembly or
other application. Component manufacturers should give clear
314 See id. at 466. Comparative fault reduced Xomox's liability to five percent.
See id. at 459.
315 See Woods v. Graham Eng'g Corp., 539 N.E.2d 316, 318 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
316 See Pasquale v. Speed Prod. Eng'g, 654 N.E.2d 1365, 1375 (Ill. 1995). As to
the difference between intervening and superseding causes, Prosser states that
the question in a case of an intervening force is whether the defendant is to be
relieved of responsibility and the defendant's liability superseded by a subsequent
event. See PROSSER, supra note 75, at 302.
317 Pasquale, 654 N.E.2d at 1369-70. While design was the issue in Woods and
Pasquale, another case involving a farm implement concerned failure to warn in
which the defendant claimed a superseding, intervening cause. SeeJaurequi, 971
F. Supp. at 422. The court noted that the corn head at issue had been painted
over twice, and found that the plaintiff had not raised a factual issue for trial
concerning proximate cause of his injuries. See id. at 430-431 (stating that the
plaintiff attempted to assert that he was not aware of specific areas of danger
within the corn head, but had been verbally warned by his supervisors on several
occasions just prior to the accident that he should never go in front of the corn
head near the region of the snouts).
318 See Woodling, 813 F.2d at 543.
319 See id. at 554-55.
320 See id. at 556.
321 See id.
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warnings and directions for the use of their products. If a com-
ponent must be used only in certain ways, if a component must
not be altered in some particular manner, or if a component
must not be used under conditions or temperatures the manu-
facturer considers inappropriate, the manufacturer should indi-
cate as much in its literature. The defense of supervening cause
would then be available for the component manufacturer in a
products liability suit.
VI. CONCLUSION
It goes without saying that a component manufacturer can
best avoid liability by furnishing parts without defects. There is
no liability if a component part is not defective. 22 A component
manufacturer who does not design a system into which the parts
are assembled and whose finished product conforms to the
manufacturer's own standards is not liable for a defect in that
system.123 To avoid suits over failure to warn, a component man-
ufacturer should give adequate warnings and directions con-
cerning the uses and limitations of his products.3 24 If those
components are used beyond the manufacturer's specifications,
a variety of defenses are available to the manufacturer. These
include product misuse, assumption of risk, preemption, gov-
ernment contractor defense, learned intermediary and sophisti-
cated user defenses, and intervening causes. No defect in the
product, however, remains the best defense.
These principles hold in the main case cited in this comment,
Woodling v. Garrett Corp.3 25 The jury assessed liability against the
owner and operator of the aircraft, Texasgulf Aviation, at
70%.326 Garrett Corp., installer of the generator control units
322 See § 402A, supra note 13 (stating that a seller is subject to liability only if his
products are in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or con-
sumer); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS IABILITY, supra note 1, § 5
cmt. a (stating that component sellers should not be liable when the component
itself is not defective).
323 See Sipes, 946 S.W.2d at 159; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIA-
BILITv, supra note 1, § 5 (b) (stating that the seller or distributor of the compo-
nent is liable only if she substantially participates in the integration of the
component into the design of the product, and the integration of the compo-
nent causes the product to be defective, and the defect in the product causes the
harm).
324 See Latin, supra note 174, at 1196. Latin believes that manufacturers could
make products safer and that manufacturers sometimes use labels and warnings
in lieu of, rather than in addition to, safer products. See id.
325 813 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1987).
326 See id. at 548.
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on the aircraft, was found 20% liable for negligent installation
of the generator control units.3 21 Phoenix Aerospace, Inc.
designed and manufactured the generator control units and was
held only 5% liable. 28 The systems designer, Colt Electronics
Co., was also found liable to the extent of 5%.329
The court noted that Texasgulf Aviation's appeal focused not
on issues of fact related to the operation of the aircraft and the
crash but rather on whether its liability was muted by worker's
compensation immunity and a release signed by Mrs. Wood-
ling.3 0 Phoenix Aerospace and Garrett pinned their appeal
hopes on the allegedly supervening conduct of Texasgulf Avia-
tion.331 However, the court found that neither Garrett nor
Phoenix had warned Texasgulf Aviation, and when Texasgulf
Aviation continued to operate the aircraft under such condi-
tions, Garrett should have known that the operator would be
unable to determine whether the problem was solved. 33 2 Colt
did not appeal the finding of its negligence with respect to the
preparation of the installation drawings.333
Woodling is a cautionary tale in many ways. Ambiguity in the
installation drawings or defects in adaptation of the units for the
aircraft provided sufficient evidence upon which the court
found Colt negligent. This negligence may have consisted of
failure to warn, a failure that also applied to both Garrett and
Phoenix. The court found liability for all three defendants in
spite of a common-sense feeling that Texasgulf Aviation as-
sumed an extraordinary risk of flying under the following condi-
tions: bad weather, multiple failures of necessary equipment and
a procession of skilled aviation personnel who refused to fly the
aircraft. Courts will not hesitate to find liability even for small





3-0 See id. at 549.
331 See Woodling, 813 F.2d at 554.
332 See id. at 555-56.
333 See id. at 549.
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